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ABSTRACT 
 Artificial intelligence (AI) is a field of research with the potential to radically 
change society’s use of information technology, particularly how personal information 
will be interconnected and how private lives will be accessible to cybercriminals. 
Criminals, motivated by profit, are likely to adapt future AI software systems to their 
operations, further complicating present-day cybercrime investigations. This thesis 
examines how transnational criminal organizations and cybercriminals may leverage 
developing AI technology to conduct more sophisticated criminal activities and what 
steps the homeland security enterprise should take to prepare. Through a future scenario 
methodology, four scenarios were developed to project how cybercriminals might use AI 
systems and what should be done now to protect the United States from the malicious use 
of AI. This thesis recommends that homeland security officials expand outreach 
initiatives among private industry and academia that are developing AI systems to 
understand the dual-use implications of emerging AI technology and to provide public 
security perspectives to AI research entities. Finally, this thesis recommends that federal 
agencies develop specific initiatives—aligning with existing national cyber and AI 
strategies—that confront the potential challenge of future, AI-enabled cybercrime. 
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Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to dramatically transform how society 
interacts with information technology, particularly how personal information will 
interconnect with the hardware and software systems people use on a daily basis. The 
combination of developing AI systems and a digitally connected society could transform 
our culture in a manner not seen since the Industrial Revolution.1 Experts in the field of AI 
disagree on the pace at which the technology will develop; however, cognitive computing 
and machine learning are likely to affect homeland security in the coming years.2 
Criminals, motivated by profit, are likely to adapt future AI software systems to their 
operations, further complicating present-day cybercrime investigations.3 If the homeland 
security enterprise is going to be prepared for the potential malicious usage of AI 
technology, it must begin to examine how criminal elements may use the technology and 
what should be done today to ensure it is ready for tomorrow’s threat. 
This thesis examines how transnational criminal organizations and cybercriminals 
may leverage developing AI technology to conduct more sophisticated criminal activities 
and what steps the homeland security enterprise should take to prepare. A byproduct of 
ongoing research is that criminals may create malevolent AI. Cybercriminals, motivated 
by profit, may attempt to develop proxy AI systems that mask their involvement, avoid 
risk, and direct attribution and responsibility.4 The malicious use of AI could threaten 
digital security, and machines could become as proficient at hacking and social engineering 
                                                 
1 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity 
in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), loc. 90 of 306, Kindle. 
2 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2017), 30. 
3 John Markoff, “As Artificial Intelligence Evolves, so Does Its Criminal Potential,” New York Times, 
October 23, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/technology/artificial-intelligence-evolves-with-its-
criminal-potential.html. 
4 Federico Pistono and Roman V. Yampolskiy, “Unethical Research: How to Create a Malevolent 
Artificial Intelligence” (paper presented at the Ethics for Artificial Intelligence Workshop, New York, NY, 
July 9–15, 2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.02817. 
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as human cybercriminals.5 The ability to detect cybersecurity attacks from malicious AI is 
predicated on an examination of these technologies and their application to existing 
criminal patterns and activities. Criminals have long demonstrated that they are early 
adopters of new technologies, and they will almost certainly incorporate AI into their 
criminal enterprises.6 
This thesis applied a red-teaming approach—using a future scenario 
methodology—to project how cybercriminals may use AI systems and what should be done 
now to protect the United States from the malicious use of AI. The analysis first considered 
current fields of AI research, likely timelines for technological developments, and AI’s 
perceived impact on daily life in the United States over the next ten years. Next, the analysis 
examined how present-day cybercrime threats—such as remote-controlled aerial systems, 
the ability to create fake video files, spear phishing attacks, and social media profiling—
could be enhanced by future AI systems. The final step in the analysis was to examine these 
scenarios and build countermeasures that homeland security officials in the United States 
could employ to mitigate the potential risks of malicious AI. The criminal use of AI will 
likely affect multiple echelons of government, and a strategic review analyzes the policy 
framework required to confront the threats identified in the AI scenarios. Best practices 
from foreign partners were examined to find strategies and methodologies that could be 
applied within the United States. A tactical review analyzed how law enforcement agencies 
could respond to the attacks in the AI scenarios and what existing law enforcement 
operations could be adapted to prepare for malicious AI.  
The progression of AI is uncertain, and the scenarios highlight the ways that 
cybercriminals could leverage even relatively minor technological developments. 
Education and awareness of emerging technologies should form the basis of how 
cybercrime is examined. The thesis recommends that the homeland security enterprise 
expand outreach programs and partner with private industry and academia that are 
                                                 
5 Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and 
Mitigation (Oxford: University of Oxford, February 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.07228. 
6 Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Inside the Digital Underground and the Battle for Our Connected 
World (New York: Anchor Books, 2016), loc. 1 of 392, Kindle. 
xvii 
developing AI systems in order to understand the dual-use implications of emerging AI 
technology. Public security officials also have much to offer the AI research community; 
perspectives from law enforcement, emergency response, policymakers, and intelligence 
officials will be vital to assisting in the development of safe and ethical AI systems. Federal 
agencies with cybercrime enforcement authority should develop strategies that align with 
existing national cyber and AI strategies and can form the framework for confronting the 
potential challenge of future AI-enabled cybercrime.  
This research concludes that the potential threats posed by cybercriminals’ use of 
AI are not a challenge that can be mitigated by any one agency. Rather, a coalition of 
willing partners across multiple echelons of government, private industry, and academia 
will need to work together to combat future cybercrime. International partnerships with 
law enforcement agencies and associations that support anti-crime operations will also be 
critical in tracking, investigating, and prosecuting future cybercrime. This thesis begins the 
discussion of how to confront the challenge of future AI-enabled cybercrime and seeks to 
expand awareness of how to combat dual-use emerging technologies. 
xviii 
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By far the greatest danger of Artificial Intelligence is that people conclude 
too early that they understand it.  
  —Eliezer Yudkowsky1 
 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the following questions: How might transnational criminal 
organizations (TCOs) and cybercriminals leverage developing AI technology to conduct 
more sophisticated criminal activities, and how should the homeland security enterprise 
prepare?2 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a field of research that has the potential to radically 
change society’s use of information technology, particularly how personal information will 
be interconnected and how private lives will be accessible to cybercriminals. Experts in the 
field of AI disagree on the pace at which the technology will develop; however, cognitive 
computing and machine learning are likely to affect homeland security in the near future.3 
The potential adaption of commercially available unmanned aerial systems with 
homemade weapon systems and emerging cognitive computing systems should concern 
                                                 
1 Amnon H. Eden et al., Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment (New 
York: Springer, 2012), 183.  
2 “Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who 
operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, 
wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/ or 
violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the 
exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. There is no single structure under 
which transnational organized criminals operate; they vary from hierarchies to clans, networks, and cells, 
and may evolve to other structures.” National Security Council, “Strategy to Combat Transnational 
Organized Crime: Definition,” Obama White House, accessed August 26, 2018, https://obamawhitehouse. 
archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime/definition. Cybercrimes are crimes committed on 
the internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim. Aghastise E. Joseph, “Cybercrime 
Definition,” Computer Crime Research Center, accessed August 26, 2018, http://www.crime-research.org/ 
articles/joseph06/. 
3 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2017), 30. 
2 
homeland security practitioners and policymakers. The international community is so 
concerned about the potential development of unmanned weapons systems that some 
scholars have called for an international treaty banning the creation of autonomous 
weapons systems, similar to past chemical weapons bans.4 Some researchers fear that 
autonomous weapons, designed by any nation, could accidentally cause mass civilian 
casualties.5 In the worst-case scenario, the development of autonomous weapons systems 
could spark a 21st-century arms race similar to the nuclear arms race of the 20th century.6 
Criminals and other non-state actors could leverage existing autonomous aerial drones to 
build homemade weaponized drones in the United States. The threats posed by homemade, 
AI enhanced, weaponized aerial systems are likely to be on the nearer end of the 
development horizon, and homeland security professionals need to pay close attention to 
the progression of this potential weapons system. 
The term artificial intelligence has been generally regarded as a domain of 
computer science research that includes cognitive computing, machine learning, deep 
learning, computer vision, natural-language processing, and robotics.7 Today, AI 
researchers are drawing parallels with how humans think. A recent definition from Stanford 
University’s 100 Year Study on Artificial Intelligence describes AI as “a science and a set 
of computational technologies that are inspired by—but typically operate quite differently 
from—the ways people use their nervous systems and bodies to sense, learn, reason, and 
take action.”8 Cognitive computing systems develop a coherent, complete, and unified 
understanding, and these systems are often compared to the human brain’s processing 
                                                 
4 Peter Asaro, “On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 
Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making,” International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (June 
2012): 687–709, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000768. 
5 Tegmark, Life 3.0. 
6 Tegmark. 
7 Nils J. Nilsson, Principles of Artificial Intelligence (Palo Alto: Tioga, 1980), 2. 
8 Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: One Hundred Year Study on Artificial 
Intelligence (Stanford: Stanford University, 2016), https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ 
ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf. 
3 
abilities.9 Cognitive computing has the potential to enhance decision-making, 
augmentation, connectivity, and the innovation of individuals and organizations.10 
One byproduct of ongoing research might be that criminals begin to create 
malevolent AI. Cybercriminals who are motivated by profit might attempt to develop proxy 
AI systems that mask their involvement, avoid risk, and direct attribution and 
responsibility.11 The malicious use of AI could threaten digital security, and machines 
could become as proficient at hacking and social engineering as human cybercriminals.12 
The ability to detect cybersecurity attacks from malicious AI is predicated on an 
examination of these technologies and their application to existing criminal patterns and 
activities. Criminals have long demonstrated that they are early adopters of new 
technologies.13  
Homeland security leaders should begin to examine how AI can be used for harm 
and what steps can be taken to ensure public safety. Given the uncertain future for AI 
research, implementation, and wide-scale adoption, the development of future scenarios 
may provide a framework for analyzing potential threats. After examining four scenarios 
written around challenges posed by more advanced forms of AI, this thesis applies red-
teaming processes to anticipate how criminals could leverage technology in future crimes. 
The combination of future scenarios and red-teaming helps to project how emerging 
technology may be used for criminal purposes and then to develop proactive measures to 
mitigate the potential threats the homeland security enterprise is likely to face.  
                                                 
9 Dharmendra S. Modha et al., “Cognitive Computing,” Communications of the ACM 54, no. 8 (August 
2011): 62–71, https://doi.org/10.1145/1978542.1978559. 
10 H. Demirkan, J. C. Spohrer, and J. J. Welser, “Digital Innovation and Strategic Transformation,” IT 
Professional 18, no. 6 (2017): 14–18, https://doi.org/10.1109/MITP.2017.3051332. 
11 Federico Pistono and Roman V. Yampolskiy, “Unethical Research: How to Create a Malevolent 
Artificial Intelligence” (paper presented at the Ethics for Artificial Intelligence Workshop, New York, NY, 
July 9–15, 2016), http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.02817. 
12 Miles Brundage et al., The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and 
Mitigation (Oxford: University of Oxford, February 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.07228. 
13 Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Inside the Digital Underground and the Battle for Our Connected 
World (New York: Anchor Books, 2016), loc. 1 of 392, Kindle. 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is principally a projection of how transnational criminal organizations, 
individual cybercriminals, or other illicit actors who are motivated by profit might use AI 
and what should be done now to protect the United States from the malicious use of AI. 
This thesis neither examines how nation-states or non-state organizations might use AI 
against U.S. interests nor explores the ethical considerations of developing or using AI.14 
This thesis further assumes that AI research will progress despite concerns that its 
developments will bring negative socio-economic impacts to society. The future scenarios 
in this study also assume that criminal activities will be driven by profit; future crimes 
committed for moral, political, or ethical purposes are outside the scope of this research. 
Finally, this study assumes that AI will be familiar to and widely adopted across all social-
economic groups in the United States, thus giving criminals the ability to use malicious AI 
on a large scale. In AI’s likely transition from academic settings and corporate laboratories 
to a general population that experiments with machine learning, robotics, and additive 
manufacturing, the technologies will likely fall in the hands of a few dedicated enthusiasts 
who will hone their skills to produce viable malicious systems in service of TCOs. 
1. Instrumentation 
The artificial intelligence research in this study relies on peer-reviewed journals, 
published findings from private industry, academic conference presentations, and open-
source news reporting that informs the general public on advances in AI. This inquiry into 
TCO activities and how they could be adapted to future AI breakthroughs is supported by 
peer-reviewed, criminal justice journals, the published accounts of cybercriminals, 
researchers in the field of cryptocurrencies, and case studies of Dark Net criminal activities.  
2. Steps of Analysis 
The analysis outlined in this thesis follows several steps to explain the potential 
trajectories of AI research, the ways criminal actors could leverage AI against the United 
States, and the steps the homeland security enterprise should be taking now to protect 
                                                 
14 Tegmark, Life 3.0, 126. 
5 
society from malicious AI. First, the analysis considered current fields of AI research, 
likely timelines for technologic developments, and the projected impact of AI in daily life 
in the United States over the next 10 years. This step considered multiple viewpoints on AI 
development and favored the most accelerated projections for AI development timelines. 
This thesis uses scenario planning, future studies, and red-teaming methods to develop four 
scenarios whereby future AI developments dramatically change significant aspects of 
society.15 The first scenario examines how a criminal could build fully autonomous 
weapons systems from commercially available components and how the systems could be 
designed to minimize the criminal’s exposure to detection. The second scenario explores 
how future AI technology could create deepfake video files that appear to be genuine 
footage for the purpose of extorting victims. The third scenario demonstrates how 
cybercriminals could create a malicious AI interface that fools a person into divulging 
personal information or giving access to sensitive data. Finally, the fourth scenario explores 
how AI systems could convince someone that a loved one has been virtually kidnapped for 
purposes of ransom. 
After developing the four future AI scenarios, the second step was to consider how 
AI could be used for malicious purposes. This thesis uses scenario planning to explore, 
from a red-team perspective, how AI technology might be used against the United States 
by criminal actors. Scenario planning facilitates foresight and helps to identify potential 
outcomes that may seem unthinkable.16 Scenario planning can also form the basis for 
decision-making and future strategic development efforts.17 The first scenario shows how 
criminal actors could build an autonomous weapon system and use it to conduct a 
financially motivated assassination of a public official. The second scenario demonstrates 
how a deepfake video could compromise a person’s reputation and be used to extort 
financial interests. The third scenario shows how AI can enhance current spearphishing 
15 A. J. Masys, “Black Swans to Grey Swans: Revealing the Uncertainty,” Disaster Prevention and 
Management 21, no. 3 (2012): 320–35, https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561211234507. 
16 Masys, 322. 
17 Bill Ralston and Ian Wilson, The Scenario-Planning Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide to 
Developing and Using Scenarios to Direct Strategy in Today’s Uncertain Times (Mason, OH: 
Thomson/South-Western, 2006), 21. 
6 
tactics and make detection extremely difficult. The last scenario shows how AI could 
leverage information from a victim’s social media accounts and online activity to generate 
a realistic pattern-of-life profile to commit a virtual kidnapping.  
The third and final step in the analysis was to examine these scenarios and build 
countermeasures that homeland security officials in the United States could employ to 
mitigate the potential risks of malicious AI. The criminal use of AI will likely affect 
multiple echelons of government. A strategic review analyzes the policy framework 
required to confront the threats identified in the AI scenarios. A tactical review analyzes 
how to respond to the attacks in the AI scenarios. Last, a technical review outlines 
recommendations for homeland security officials that will promote awareness among the 
community of how criminals could use emerging AI technology. 
3. Intended Output
The intended output of this research is twofold: a clearer (if hypothetical) sense of 
how AI could be used by criminals motivated by profit and policy recommendations for 
proactively protecting against the unintended consequences of AI research, development, 
and implementation. The intended audience for this thesis includes federal, state, and local 
law enforcement, as well as federal, state, and local agencies with homeland security 
responsibilities. 
D. BREAKING DOWN THE SCENARIOS 
The four future scenarios underscore the complexities that malicious AI will bring 
to the homeland security environment, and they also demonstrate how the modern 
information environment will merge with developing AI. Emerging technologies beyond 
AI will interconnect in new ways and—with information systems and the amount of 
information that will be available for deep-learning algorithms—expand exponentially.18 
Personally identifiable information (PII) and society’s use of social media platforms will 
18 P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2010), 96. 
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also connect us in new ways and offer AI developers new information sources for building 
more complex deep-learning tools.19 
Table 1 highlights how the four future scenarios interrelate with a range of themes 
discussed throughout this thesis. Each of the fictitious criminal actors relies on a variety of 
societal and geopolitical realities to enable the use of malicious AI in their activities. 
Several areas, specifically international relations, virtual borders, social media, and 
machine learning (ML) technologies, are used in all four future scenarios. The table seems 
to suggest that the homeland security enterprise has to understand the environment in which 
malicious AI could be deployed to develop policies and strategies to protect against new 
cybercrime threats. 
Table 1. Overview of Future Scenarios 
AI systems, particularly ML systems, presently being developed use large amounts 
of data to keep improving performance, without human intervention.20 As data are 
19 William D. Eggers, Delivering on Digital: The Innovators and Technologies That Are Transforming 
Government (New York: Rosetta Books, 2016), loc. 3791 of 4730, Kindle. 
20 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, “The Business of Artificial Intelligence: What It Can—and 
Cannot—Do for Your Organization,” Harvard Business Review, July 2017, 3–11. 
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processed by ML tools, neural networks analyze the information and produce sophisticated 
models that can classify even larger datasets.21 Cybercriminals could use ML neural 
networks to process large amounts of information and build target profiles of potential 
victims. PII—information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity—
that has been stolen and sold on the Dark Net and the social media activity of average users 
offer malicious AI systems a treasure trove of data to be used in criminal activities.22 
Further complicating matters, emerging technologies and consumer products are becoming 
increasingly connected to the Internet, thereby unlocking new data sources from which AI 
systems can learn. Malicious AI will connect with a wide range of technologies and have 
the ability to learn from daily, interconnected activities.  
1. Overview of Scenario 1: Autonomous Weapons Systems 
In the first scenario, a Chinese graduate school student constructs an autonomous 
weapon system that is capable of independently searching, acquiring, and conducting an 
assassination at a public event. Although terrorism and politically motivated crimes are 
outside the scope of this thesis, this attack vector is financially motivated and targets a 
public official for assassination due to his presence on a Dark Net assassination market. A 
central aspect of this scenario is the attacker’s ability to combine AI with commercial drone 
technology to create an autonomous weapons system capable of conducting an attack 
without direct human guidance. The attacker, as shown in the other scenarios, travels 
internationally during the attack phase, which complicates law enforcement efforts to 
investigate the malicious AI-enabled crime. 
Scenario 1 references current research on autonomous weapons systems and illicit 
online markets to anticipate a future threat that the homeland security enterprise may 
encounter. Paul Scharre and P. W. Singer are two notable researchers who have examined 
                                                 
21 Bernard Marr, “What Is the Difference between Deep Learning, Machine Learning and AI?,” 
Forbes, December 8, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/08/what-is-the-difference-
between-deep-learning-machine-learning-and-ai/#181f5b7426cf. 
22 Clay Johnson III, “Safeguarding against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable 
Information,” OMB Memorandum M-07-16 (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, May 
22, 2007), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2007/m07-16.pdf. 
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the future of automated systems in combat, and their research has framed and forecasted a 
possible scenario for an armed drone attack within the United States.23 Jamie Bartlett and 
James Martin have researched online illicit markets beyond illicit narcotics sales, and their 
analysis of assassination markets show how criminals could profit from an attack carried 
out on a particular date.24 Although this scenario may seem unrealistic today, distinct 
elements are presently challenging homeland security officials, and commercially available 
drones have been weaponized. Researchers at the Naval Postgraduate School have 
developed and tested software that allows aerial drones to conduct combat operations 
autonomously.25 Although there have been limited discoveries of assassination markets on 
the deep web, online contract killings have been attempted. When Silk Road mastermind 
Ross Ulbricht—known also as the Dread Pirate Roberts—was arrested by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), he had attempted to contract a killing via an online chat 
room.26 The combination of emerging drone technology with autonomous control software 
could offer would-be assassins the delivery system for future crimes. 
2. Overview of Scenario 2: Deepfakes
In the second scenario, a Croatian cyber-criminal creates a deepfake video to extort 
a successful American businessman. Although deepfakes are becoming more of a present-
day challenge, this scenario shows how an internationally based criminal could target a 
U.S.-based victim and potentially avoid American law enforcement. The cyber-criminal in 
this scenario conducts his ransom attack and then travels extensively throughout Southeast 
Asia in an effort to avoid law enforcement detection. The attacker in this scenario also uses 
23 Andy Hines, “Strategic Foresight: The State of the Art,” Futurist 40, no. 5 (October 2006): 18–21, 
https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-150978061/strategic-foresight-the-state-of-the-art. 
24 Jamie Bartlett, The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2015), 
Kindle; and James Martin, “Lost on the Silk Road: Online Drug Distribution and the ‘Cryptomarket,’” 
Criminology & Criminal Justice 14, no. 3 (July 2014): 351–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1748895813505234. 
25 Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, 1st ed. (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2018), 11–12. 
26 Nick Bilton, American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind behind the Silk Road 
(New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2017). 
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ML technologies, publicly available videos, and PII of the victim to conduct his ransom 
scheme. 
Scenario 2 uses current research into deepfake technologies to examine previous 
extortion schemes wherein deepfake videos were used. To date, many celebrities have been 
targeted by deepfake videos that have combined their images with pornographic materials, 
and foreign governments have attempted to influence French elections with false videos.27 
Deepfake videos are a present-day concern that will only become more challenging as ML 
technologies develop, increasing the authentic feel of the videos and making detection 
more difficult. 
3. Overview of Scenario 3: Identity Theft 
In the third scenario, a criminal hacker uses AI technologies to build sophisticated 
spear-phishing attacks for the purpose of stealing the identity of victims with valuable 
information residing in the United States. The hacker also uses deep-learning (DL) tools to 
quickly search for information on the victims’ computers that would be valuable on the 
Dark Net. This future scenario is based on present-day spear-phishing attacks that are 
profit-motivated. Additionally, the attacker in this scenario travels extensively throughout 
Europe while he mines the information he has stolen, making his detection and capture 
more difficult for partner law enforcement agencies. 
Scenario 3 uses research on phishing and spear-phishing attacks to project how 
these attack vectors can become more sophisticated with the use of future AI technologies. 
The scenario also highlights how the information that is freely posted online and on social 
media sites could be used against victims.  
4. Overview of Scenario 4: Virtual Kidnapping 
In the fourth scenario, a U.S.-based cyber-criminal travels to Costa Rica to research 
and build sophisticated targeting profiles for the purposes of virtually kidnapping his 
                                                 
27 Danielle Citron and Robert Chesney, “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War,” Foreign 
Affairs, February 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-
disinformation-war. 
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victims. The attacker chooses Costa Rica as the location to conduct his planning and attack 
due to the high volume of tourism from the United States—from which the attacker can 
hide his criminal activities. The attacker pretends to be a Mexico-based drug cartel, and he 
sends threatening emails to his targets’ families, claiming they will be kidnapped if a 
ransom is not paid. Although the attacker lacks the ability to actually harm his victims, the 
profiles and patterns of life he has developed on his targets provide convincing evidence 
to the families that their children are in danger if the ransom is not paid. 
Scenario 4 uses research on recent virtual kidnappings, many of which occur in 
Mexico, to extrapolate how the threat could evolve with the use of malicious AI. Similar 
to previous scenarios, PII and social media activity of the potential victims provide the 
basis for ML and DL technologies to build more sophisticated attack approaches. The 
attacker in this scenario conducts all of his research in Latin America while on vacation, 
attempting to avoid detection by U.S. authorities. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The four scenarios examine current criminal threats to imagine how they will 
evolve when cyber-criminals incorporate emerging AI technologies into their activities. 
These scenarios challenge policymakers to develop effective strategies for framing the 
responsibilities of federal, state, and local agencies in combatting future cyber-crime. The 
homeland security enterprise will also likely need to seek new and broader partnerships 
with private industry and leading AI research institutions to understand the trajectory of 
malicious AI threats. International partnerships will be critical to confronting the threats 
envisioned in the four scenarios, and the homeland security enterprise should explore 
pathways for collaborating on AI-enabled crimes. Finally, the scenarios demonstrate that 
the amount of publicly available information and the interconnected nature of society are 
making us vulnerable to more sophisticated criminal threats. We should examine how our 
information is being used and what responsibility social media firms bear when their 
platforms are used for cybercrime. 
  
12 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
If a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent. 
  —Alan Turing28 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the scholarly debates on 
four main themes of research: TCOs and cybercriminals, online illicit markets, and their 
adaptation to new technologies; AI and perspectives on its utopian or dystopian outcomes; 
Trends in AI research, machine learning, and decision support systems; and the malicious 
use of AI systems. These four themes underlie the conditions by which the future use of 
AI will likely progress, and they form the basis for developing future scenarios in Chapter 
III. TCOs and cybercriminals will ultimately be the threat actors who use developing AI 
systems, so examining how they presently adapt to emerging technologies is relevant for 
projecting their future criminal activities. Projections about the future of AI ranges widely 
from a spectrum of a utopian future and new renaissance to a dystopian future where 
autonomous computer systems annihilate the human race. An examination of research into 
AI systems, machine learning, and deep-learning technology allows for projections of how 
these technologies will progress in the coming years. Finally, a review of research on how 
AI systems could be used for malicious purposes illuminates the potential threats that the 
AI research community believes are on the horizon. 
A. TCOS AND CYBERCRIMINALS, ONLINE ILLICIT MARKETS, AND 
THEIR ADAPTATION TO NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The purpose of this literature review is to examine the most relevant research on 
how criminals use the Dark Net to conduct illegal activities and how these activities are 
likely to increase in the coming years. TCOs use online illicit markets to traffic a wide 
range of illegal commodities including humans, narcotics, stolen goods, weapons, PII, and 
                                                 
28 Alan M. Turing, “Lecture to the London Mathematical Society,” Turing Digital Archive, February 
20, 1947, http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=455&title=1. 
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intellectual property.29 As AI software develops, legally and illegally developed algorithms 
are likely to be sold on online illicit markets. It is important that the homeland security 
enterprise understands how criminals leverage online illicit markets in order to anticipate 
how AI and cognitive-computing tools will likely be sold in the future.  
Several journal articles or reports attempt to measure the volume and scale of sellers 
engaged in illicit activity on the Dark Net. Silk Road, the illicit drug market that was taken 
down in 2012, is examined in articles by Nicolas Christian, Marie-Helen Marias, James 
Martin, and Persi Paoli et al. as a case study of an illicit market operating online.30 While 
these articles are foundational, they demonstrate the challenges in measuring illegal 
activities on the Dark Net. Scholars disagree about the size and scale of online illicit 
markets, and several researchers have tried different approaches to address this issue. Persi 
Paoli et al. attempted to measure a short period, a sampling of only six days, of a 
cryptomarket for weapons trafficking while Nicolas Christian measured eight months of 
data of online traffic on the Silk Road site for his analysis.31 Persi Paoli and his colleagues 
acknowledge that their findings are limited to weapons trafficking markets, which they 
estimate comprise a small segment of commodities sold on the Dark Net.32 Christian’s 
analysis focuses on the larger segment of illegal sales on the Dark Net, and he concludes 
that most online sellers in his research were active only for a few weeks.33 The results of 
both articles are potentially combinable because they examine separate segments of illegal 
markets. However, the results of Persi Paoli et al. need to be validated by more research, 
given their limited sample. 
                                                 
29 Bartlett, The Dark Net, loc. 5 of 310.  
30 Nicolas Christin, “Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous Online 
Marketplace,” in Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on the World Wide Web (New York: 
ACM, 2013), 213–224, https://doi.org/10.1145/2488388.2488408; Marie-Helen Maras, “Inside Darknet: 
The Takedown of Silk Road,” Criminal Justice Matters 98, no. 1 (October 2, 2014): 22–23, https://doi.org/ 
10.1080/09627251.2014.984541; Martin, “Lost on the Silk Road,” 351–67; and Giacomo Persi Paoli et al., 
Behind the Curtain: The Illicit Trade of Firearms, Explosives and Ammunition on the Dark Web (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 26–29, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2091. 
html.  
31 Persi Paoli et al., Behind the Curtain, 26–29; and Christin, “Traveling the Silk Road,” 213–224. 
32 Persi Paoli et al., Behind the Curtain, 16. 
33 Christin, “Traveling the Silk Road,” 10. 
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James Martin, senior lecturer at Macquarie University in Australia, who studies 
crime on the Dark Net, used a different methodology to measure online traffic on the Silk 
Road by examining website postings and message board activities.34 Martin’s analysis 
focuses on the law enforcement strategy to combat online markets, and he demonstrates 
how message board postings can tip law enforcement to the potential scale of an online 
trafficker’s operations.35 Martin’s reliance on qualitative observations of illicit markets is 
significant for law enforcement officials because his recommendations can be used widely 
for investigations. However, Martin’s conclusions are less useful for research purposes 
because he does not provide a methodology that can be duplicated for more quantitative 
research. 
Rachael Heath-Ferguson, a sociologist at Princeton University, examines some of 
the work done by the aforementioned researchers in her 2017 journal article about methods 
for analyzing and measuring illegal activities on the Dark Net.36 In her research, Heath-
Ferguson contends that online scrapping tools used to examine the Silk Road are 
problematic due to technical shortcomings of the software applications. She claims that 
mixed research approaches may be more useful, and she recommends analyzing web 
postings—as Martin does—as a better approach for mixing data collected from quantitative 
and qualitative methods. 
The research into the scale of online illicit markets may be insufficient, and scholars 
debate how much illegal activity occurs on the Dark Net. Studies of the Silk Road comprise 
much of this research, and the findings may be too old to be applied to current online illicit 
markets.37 The size and scale of current online illicit markets may be a gap that requires 
more research. 
34 Martin, “Lost on the Silk Road,” 351–67. 
35 Martin, 364–366. 
36 Rachael Heath-Ferguson, “Offline ‘Stranger’ and Online Lurker: Methods for an Ethnography of 
Illicit Transactions on the Darknet,” Qualitative Research 17, no. 6 (2017): 687–689, https://doi.org/10. 
1177/1468794117718894. 
37 Maras, “Inside Darknet,” 22–23. 
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Another aspect of this research centers on how online criminals interact with each 
other on the Dark Net and whether there are established cultural norms for their criminal 
activities. In this area, several former hackers have written biographies on the criminal 
culture of the Dark Net. These books are marketed to the general public and provide 
entertaining stories of criminal exploits, which are of limited research value.38 Apart from 
these books, Robert Gehl argues the Dark Net has created a unique environment for 
political advocacy and a forum for social responsibility.39 Gehl, a scholar who studies 
communications, social media, and cultural studies, has interviewed Dark Net forum users 
to understand their motivations for accessing illicit sites. He believes criminal activity on 
the Dark Net is but a subset of a broader, positive environment that provides a pathway for 
people to communicate securely.40 Gehl describes the Dark Net as a location that offers 
users “radical freedom of speech” and a forum for dissidents and oppressed populations to 
communicate.41 
Gehl’s research is significant because his approach offers a different perspective 
from the other researchers mentioned in this review. While the other researchers are 
scholars who study criminal justice topics, Gehl has researched how the Dark Net can 
provide new communication pathways beyond existing social media services like 
Facebook. Gehl has researched Dark Net forums and message boards by actively engaging 
with web users. Gehl uses a pseudonym in his research, a practice that Barratt and Maddox 
rebuke in their ethnology of Dark Net forums.42 In their research, Monica Barratt and 
Alexia Maddox—researchers at the National Drug Research Institute at Curtin University 
                                                 
38 Kevin D. Mitnick and William L. Simon, Ghost in the Wires: My Adventures as the World’s Most 
Wanted Hacker, 1st ed. (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011), 20–32; Kevin Poulsen and Eric 
Michael Summerer, Kingpin: How One Hacker Took Over the Billion-Dollar Cybercrime Underground 
(New York, Crown Publishing, 2015), 32–40; and Bartlett, The Dark Net, loc. 5–17.  
39 Robert W. Gehl, “Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web Social 
Network,” New Media & Society 18, no. 7 (August 2016): 1219–35, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1461444814554900. 
40 Gehl, “Power/Freedom on the Dark Web,” 1220; and “About Robert W. Gehl,” Webpage of Robert 
W. Gehl, accessed March 7, 2019, http://www.robertwgehl.org/index.php?styleSheetSelection=mobile. 
41 Gehl, “Power/Freedom on the Dark Web,” 1219–35. 
42 Monica J. Barratt and Alexia Maddox, “Active Engagement with Stigmatised Communities through 
Digital Ethnography,” Qualitative Research 16, no. 6 (December 2016): 701–19, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1468794116648766. 
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in Australia—use their real identities when engaging on the Dark Net because they believe 
that the research subjects will be more forthcoming. Their research is focused more broadly 
on stigmatized communities, and they use the Dark Net and online drug markets as a case 
study.  
The research discussed in this sub-literature section on online illicit markets is 
generally in agreement regarding the challenges of quantifying criminal activities on the 
Dark Net. Illegal transactions on the Dark Net and the technology that facilitates criminal 
activities will continue to be difficult to measure because criminals are able to react to law 
enforcement tactics and avoid many forms of detection. However, this literature forms a 
solid baseline of how illegal online markets function, how criminals likely operate, and 
what the enduring detection and monitoring challenges have been. In the future, 
cybercriminals will almost certainly leverage online illicit markets in their criminal 
activities. However, AI and machine learning may offer advantages for tracking illegal 
activity online, and the homeland security enterprise may want to explore how emerging 
technologies help close the gap in the understanding of online illicit market activities. 
There are several other research areas—beyond the four themes in this literature 
review—that may provide valuable insights into how malicious AI could affect homeland 
security in the future. The threat of malicious AI is not limited to the United States, and a 
study of how foreign partners are confronting cybercrime and AI development is worthy 
of review. AI research today is confronting the ethical implications of developing artificial 
general intelligence, and homeland security practitioners should be involved in discussions 
of machine ethics.43 Finally, AI has the potential to link personal information in ways yet 
to be anticipated, and the impact of AI research is an important topic to explore. 
43 Miles Brundage, “Limitations and Risks of Machine Ethics,” Journal of Experimental & Theoretical 
Artificial Intelligence 26, no. 3 (September 2014): 355–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/0952813X.2014. 
895108. 
18 
B. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A BOLD NEW AGE OR 
ARMAGEDDON?  
For decades, science fiction has shaped perceptions of how artificial intelligence 
will evolve and influence future existence. Some authors portray this future as a utopian 
existence wherein AI will quickly and efficiently respond to every human need. Other 
authors depict a dystopian future wherein AI will become self-aware and ultimately 
determine that the human race is a threat that needs elimination. Future AI systems could 
resemble Isaac Asimov’s friendly “Sonny” who ultimately wanted to explore his existence 
while upholding the Three Laws of Robotics.44 AI systems could also take a darker, 
deadlier future course with Terminator robots using advanced machine-learning algorithms 
to study every aspect of our lives to better exterminate the human race.45 Science fiction 
has led to science fact and, at a minimum, helped shape our foundational biases when we 
explore the possibilities of future AI applications.  
Extensive academic research supports the utopian view of future AI, and much of 
this research promotes the idea that AI will unleash a new age of innovation. Hadley 
Reynolds and Sue Feldman, co-founders of the Cognitive Computing Consortium, have 
examined how cognitive computing will fundamentally—and positively—change how we 
interact with our digital environment.46 Their research group has attempted to make context 
computable and to build cognitive computing systems that can adapt and interact with a 
range of information.47 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, two researchers at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)’s Center for Digital Business, take a 
generally positive view of the future of AI although they do highlight how business 
                                                 
44 Isaac Asimov, Foundation; Foundation and Empire; Second Foundation; The Stars, Like Dust; The 
Naked Sun; I, Robot (Minneapolis: Amaranth Press, 1986). 
45 Randall Frakes and William Wisher, The Terminator (New York: Bantam Books, 1985). 
46 Hadley Reynolds and Sue Feldman, “Cognitive Computing: Beyond the Hype,” KM World 23, no. 7 
(July/August 2014): 1, 22, http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/News/News-Analysis/Cognitive-computing-
Beyond-the-hype-97685.aspx. 
47 Susan Feldman and Hadley Reynolds, “Cognitive Computing: A Definition and Some Thoughts,” 
KM World 23, no. 10 (November/December 2014), http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/News/News-
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dynamics will present challenges in future labor markets.48 They offer examples of how 
emerging technology will reshape how industries function, for instance, Airbnb and Uber 
are hotel and transportation companies, respectively, but do not own hotels or taxis.49 In 
their book, Brynjolfsson and McAfee argue that despite the radical changes as a result of 
emerging technology, such as AI, there are opportunities for adapting industries and society 
to make the most of the technological advancements.50 Aguilar et al. also believe that 
artificial and biological life will merge and that artificial intelligence should be considered 
another form of life to be studied.51 
In contrast, a wide body of academic research and magazine articles contends 
artificial intelligence will ultimately terminate human existence. James Barrat, a researcher 
and documentary filmmaker, believes that artificial intelligence research is fundamentally 
dangerous and that AI will eventually develop a sense of self-preservation, which will 
prove dangerous to humans.52 Although Barrat’s book has been popular among the general 
population, his analysis is fundamentally flawed as he approaches his research from the 
position that AI is dangerous technology.53 Basarab Nicolescu believes that artificial 
intelligence will achieve a technological singularity whereby it develops to the point that 
it is capable of autonomous self-improvement, and its objectives are destructive to the 
human race.54 Nick Bolstrom, a University of Oxford Philosopher, believes that AI will 
48 Amy Bernstein and Anand Raman, “The Great Decoupling: An Interview with Erik Brynjolfsson 
and Andrew McAfee,” Harvard Business Review, June 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/06/the-great-decoupling. 
49 Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), loc. 14 of 404, Kindle. 
50 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, The Second Machine Age, 206–218. 
51 Wendy Aguilar et al., “The Past, Present, and Future of Artificial Life,” Frontiers in Robotics and AI 
1 (2014), https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2014.00008. 
52 James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (New York: 
Thomas Dunne Books, 2013). 
53 Gary Marcus, “Why We Should Think about the Threat of Artificial Intelligence,” New Yorker, 
October 24, 2013, https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/why-we-should-think-about-the-threat-of-
artificial-intelligence. 
54 Basarab Nicolescu, “The Dark Side of Technological Singularity: New Barbarism,” Cybernetics & 
Human Knowing 23, no. 4 (2016): 77–81, http://chkjournal.com/node/237. 
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ultimately become an existential threat to humanity, and society must prepare now to 
control a future super-intelligent agent.55 
In between the two extremes of utopian and dystopian futures for AI is a large group 
of computer scientists, ethicists, political advocates, and futurists who believe that the 
future for AI is unclear but now is the time to focus on ethics and goal orientation for all 
AI research. Max Tegmark, an MIT physics professor, believes that AI is generally a 
positive scientific development, and the world must focus on developing ethical systems 
with goals that align with humanity’s best interests.56 His book, Life 3.0: Being Human in 
the Age of Artificial Intelligence, is widely available in many commercial bookstores and 
was listed as one of President Obama’s favorite books in 2018.57 Tegmark also helped 
found the Future of Life Institute, which supports research into safeguarding AI 
development. In 2017, the Future of Life Institute hosted a conference in Pacific Grove, 
California, developing the 23 Asilomar Principals for the safe and ethical development of 
beneficial AI technology.58 In addition to providing an ethical framework for AI research, 
the Asilomar Principals have also influenced public policy legislation, and in October 
2017, the California Senate endorsed the principals.59 Garry Kasparov, the chess 
grandmaster who famously lost to IBM’s Deep Blue AI chess program in 1997, believes 
that future AI will help humans make better decisions.60 In his book, Kasparov outlines his 
personal journey to the conclusion that AI-enhanced decision-making will unleash a new 
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58 Lisa Morgan, “How to Achieve Ethical Design,” Software Development Times, November 5, 2018, 
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https://www.natlawreview.com/article/iot-and-ai-update-california-legislature-passes-bills-internet-things-
artificial. 
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and more efficient age.61 Futurist Richard Yonck also believes that AI will have the ability 
to connect with humans in deep, emotional ways, and there will be great potential for AI-
enabled technology to make us happier and feel more fulfilled.62 However, Yonck believes, 
as does Tegmark, that goal orientation is a vital consideration in any AI programming, and 
the best strategies for successful AI development must include humans.63  
Both utopian and dystopian viewpoints often agree that at some future time, AI will 
achieve a singularity wherein computer programming will be able to improve itself without 
human involvement and ultimately become smarter than humans.64 However, there is less 
agreement when it comes to predicting when the singularity will occur. Ray Kurzweil, 
futurist and Google’s director of engineering, believes that AI will pass the Turing test by 
2029 and that singularity will occur by 2045.65 Louis Rosenberg, the CEO of Unanimous 
AI and an artificial intelligence researcher, believes that singularity will occur closer to 
2030.66 Jurgen Schmidhuber—often referred to in AI research communities as the father 
of artificial intelligence—also believes that singularity will happen in about 30 years 
because human/computer interface technology will advance to the point of artificial 
superintelligence.67 
Tegmark believes that the timeline for artificial general intelligence, or singularity, 
is difficult to determine; however, researchers should focus on goal alignment to build 
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beneficial AI technologies.68 In Tegmark’s estimation, goal alignment and the 
development of AI that adheres to moral and ethical frameworks are crucial and need to be 
a priority for the AI research community today.69 Tegmark’s position—that researchers 
must be aware of the ethical implications of their research—is vital in examining how 
cybercriminals may use future AI in their criminal endeavors. 
C. TRENDS IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE LEARNING, 
AND DEEP LEARNING 
The AI research community disagrees on a timeline for groundbreaking 
achievements in AI technology that will radically transform society. In order to examine 
trends in AI research and its fields, which will ultimately determine the timelines for 
significant breakthroughs, it is important to dissect the debates surrounding machine 
learning and deep learning. Although there is debate over the speed at which AI research 
will progress, Figure 1 depicts the generally accepted hierarchy of AI systems and their 
interrelation.  
                                                 
68 Max Tegmark, Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 1st ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), loc. 659 of 6414, Kindle. 
69 Andrew Anthony, “Max Tegmark: ‘Machines Taking Control Doesn’t Have to Be a Bad Thing,’” 




Figure 1. Relationship of Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and 
Deep Learning70 
Researchers agree that artificial intelligence is an umbrella term to describe a 
subfield of computer science that examines how computers can imitate human 
intelligence.71 The subfields and terminology of machine learning and deep learning are 
often intermingled, and there are varying positions on how the fields interrelate. Miles 
Brundage et al. define machine learning as the ability of machines to access large amounts 
of data and improve themselves without human intervention and, over time, through 
experience.72 Tim Jones generally agrees with this classification of ML although Jones 
believes that ML also covers research techniques including human supervision.73 Bernard 
Marr also believes that machine-learning systems should be categorized as systems that 
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use neural networks to classify information in the ways humans do while leveraging 
increased processing speeds and accuracy.74 Marr also describes deep learning as a subset 
of machine learning that more narrowly focuses on tools and techniques as well as methods 
for solving problems that require thought.75 Marr describes deep-learning networks as 
processes that analyze large amounts of data and then classify them accordingly.76 Janine 
Sneed agrees with Brundage et al.; however, she disagrees with Marr on the distinction of 
DL. Sneed agrees that DL is a subset of ML that includes supervised or unsupervised 
learning, but she believes that DL is identified by artificial neural networks, inspired by the 
human understanding of biology.77 Sneed believes that the deep in DL is due to the depth 
of layers that make up artificial neural networks.78  
A wide body of research focuses on human vis-à-vis machine contests as harbingers 
of how AI will affect society and the potential applications of AI systems. After his famous 
loss to IBM’s Deep Blue in 1997, Chess Grandmaster Garry Kasparov focused his research 
on how AI systems can be paired with human decision-makers.79 Kasparov’s research is 
noteworthy because it acknowledges his personal bias against IBM’s Deep Blue and 
because it explores ways to benefit from machine learning while keeping a human in 
decision-making processes.80 Alpha Go, Google Deepmind’s AI system that famously beat 
the world’s best Go player in 2015, was a breakthrough that shocked many in the AI 
research community.81 When IBM’s Watson won the game show Jeopardy in 2011, beating 
two previous champions, the general population took notice, and many articles about AI 
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technology were written in a wide range of publications. The majority of these articles lack 
substance on AI development trajectories and offer little insights for academic research. 
However, some researchers in examining the achievements of Alpha Go and Watson have 
determined that significant AI breakthroughs may become more commonplace. Timothy 
Revell, a science writer for New Scientist magazine, notes that an AI system designed by 
Google’s Deepmind passes an aptitude test that suggests AI is becoming more human-
like.82 Christine Horton, a British cybersecurity expert, believes that the hype around AI 
developments underscores the potential for human augmentation and the ability for society 
to partner with learning computer systems.83 
AI systems will be integrated into a wide range of hardware and software systems, 
and projections on how AI will change our lives are relevant to this thesis given that 
cybercriminals will likely use these connections against us. Research by Thomas Arnold, 
Daniel Kasenberg, and Matthias Scheutz is applicable to this thesis; they argue that 
machine ethics is critical to all AI designs given the likely widespread adoption of AI 
systems.84 Peter Asaro, a philosopher of technology at Stanford Law School’s Center for 
Internet and Society, is one of many ethicists concerned that AI systems will be 
incorporated into weapons systems, dramatically shifting future armed conflicts.85 Noah 
Goodall, a Professor at the University of Virginia and a senior transportation researcher for 
the Virginia Transportation Research Council, has conducted research into ethical 
decision-making for autonomous vehicles, which he claims have the potential to affect a 
wide range of autonomous systems. He argues that AI systems in autonomous vehicles will 
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have to make life-and-death decisions based on rapidly changing driving situations.86 As 
AI systems become more integrated into technologies and equipment used on a daily basis, 
the implications of aggregating new data sources with machine-learning algorithms will be 
an issue for continuing research.  
D. MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 
Research into the potential malicious uses of AI is a relatively new subset of the AI 
research community, and multiple universities and institutions are focusing on safety 
designs for AI. Many researchers and ethicists argue that malicious AI is a potential 
byproduct of ethical research and that computer scientists should be more aware of the 
unintended consequences of their research.87 Machine-learning tools that produce 
deepfakes—a set of techniques that synthesize new visual products by replacing faces in 
original files—have garnered broad media attention, and almost weekly, a major news 
organization publishes a story about the potential dangers of deepfakes.88 A broad spectrum 
of scientific fields agrees that AI systems need to be designed with goals and ethics that 
mirror human values, or “value alignment,” to minimize the risks of malicious AI.89 
One report, in particular, was foundational for this thesis. In February 2018, seven 
research institutes and 26 researchers published a comprehensive study that examined how 
malicious AI could be created and how to mitigate the risks associated with it.90 This report 
should form the basis of future academic research into malicious AI—the breadth of 
expertise used in the study ensured that a broad range of factors was considered in the 
report’s analysis. Research by Federico Pistono and Roman Yampolskiy is also valuable 
because they argue that AI systems may become dangerous at multiple stages of 
development, and ethical safeguards need to be employed throughout the scientific process 
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of AI design.91 Yasmin Tadjdeh, a senior editor and researcher at National Defense 
magazine, believes that vulnerabilities exist at multiple phases of AI research, design, and 
implementation and that organizations need to consider safety as they employ AI in their 
operations.92  
Deepfake videos have received extensive media coverage, and most of the related 
research focuses on the technologies used to create them, methods for detection, privacy 
concerns, and the implications for public trust in government institutions. Although some 
deepfakes are humorous, others are terrifying violations of privacy or brand image and 
have serious emotional impacts for the victims. Figure 2 is an example of a highly 
sophisticated deepfake video that combined the face of Steve Buscemi with the body of 
Jennifer Lawrence.  
91 Pistono and Yampolskiy, “Unethical Research.” 




Figure 2. Photographs of Jennifer Lawrence and Steve Buscemi (Top) and 
Deepfake Video Combining Their Images (Bottom)93 
Although this video was obviously fake and was the product of machine-learning 
tools, security experts are concerned that these videos will increasingly become more 
sophisticated and difficult to detect.94 Some researchers fear that deepfake technology 
could be used to target government intuitions and diminish public trust. Robert Chesney 
and Danielle Citron argue that although Deepfake technologies were not used in the 
Russian hack and release of doctored documents prior to the 2017 presidential election in 
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France, deepfake videos are the next logical step in Russian efforts to use social media to 
undermine western democracies and the United States.95 
There is growing research into methods for detecting deepfakes and for training 
machine-learning tools to identify false videos. Darius Afchar et al.—computer scientists 
and machine-learning researchers—have built a video forgery detection network that 
successfully detects 98 percent of the deepfake videos it processes.96 David Güera and 
Edward Delp, researchers at the Video and Image Processing Laboratory at Purdue 
University, have also developed methods for detecting deepfakes using neural networks to 
analyze and classify whether a video has been subject to manipulation.97 
There has been significant news coverage on privacy concerns and the broader 
implications of deepfakes. Figure 3 is an example of a celebrity whose likeness was used 
to create a pornographic deepfake video without her consent.98 Robert Chesney and 
Danielle Keats are researching the privacy implications of creating fake videos that use a 
person’s image without consent.99 Their research offers insights into the current legal 
challenges of preventing the creation of pornographic or personally damaging deepfakes. 
Chesney and Keats also examine the geopolitical implications of nation-states using 
deepfake videos as tools to influence public opinion and as a method for psychological 
operations.100 
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Figure 3. Photograph (Left) and Deepfake Video (Right) of Daisy Ridley101 
Research by Max Tegmark and the Future of Life Institute advocate for ethics and 
value orientation to be built into AI systems to help minimize the risks of malicious AI. 
The Future of Life Institute has hosted three conferences—two in Puerto Rico and one in 
Monterey, California—that examine, among other topics, methods for ensuring AI 
research focuses on ethical responsibility and goal orientation. Thomas Arnold, Daniel 
Kasenberg, and Matthias Scheutz, computer scientists and researchers at Tufts University, 
have examined methods for building value alignment into machine-learning systems. Miles 
Brundage, a researcher at Open AI, has published extensively on AI ethics, arguing that 
designing ethics into computer systems does not always translate into ethical behavior.102 
This line of research is important to this thesis because it highlights the challenges of 
developing machine-learning tools that avoid being used for malicious purposes. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter highlighted the diverse views that exist among scholars studying AI 
and its sub-fields as well as the potential impact of emerging AI technology on society in 
the coming years. In developing the four scenarios in the next chapter and the tactical and 
strategic responses in the subsequent chapters, this thesis drew on some of the most drastic 
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projections from the scholarly debates discussed in this literature review. TCOs and 
cybercriminals have demonstrated their ability to adapt to emerging technologies, and 
illicit online markets will likely be used in future AI-enabled crimes. Views on the future 
of AI and the technology’s impact on society vary greatly, but focusing on the potential 
dangers of the malicious use of AI seems prudent. Law enforcement agencies and 
policymakers will need to stay apprised of trends in AI research and the field’s 
development. Finally, the AI research community has begun in recent years to focus on the 
implications of their research, not to mention the potential harmful adaptations of emerging 
AI technology. Homeland security officials, across multiple disciplines, should join these 
discussions to better understand how present-day cybercrime could evolve in the future. 
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Do you know what is America’s greatest export? . . . It is an idea, really. A 
dream: “Star Trek.” 
  —Singer and Cole,  
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War103 
 
The homeland security enterprise is likely to face a range of complex, criminal 
threats from AI-enabled cybercrime in the future. This chapter presents four possible future 
scenarios that forecast what those threats might look like and what challenges law 
enforcement officials and policymakers could be confronted with. Although these four 
scenarios are fictitious, they were fabricated from current criminal threats and projections 
of where AI technology could be within the next several years.  
A. SCENARIO 1: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 
Zhang Wei checked his watch to ensure there was still ample time for all the 
preparations prior to his flight. This was going to be his largest and most complex score, 
so he could not afford to make careless mistakes. Zhang Wei had spent nine months 
preparing the assassination scheme he was minutes from launching, and his journey from 
promising computer scientist to calculated murderer had occurred without anyone taking 
notice. Zhang Wei had never been wealthy, but he had been more prosperous than many in 
his home providence of Guangdong, China. After today, he would be wealthier than any 
person he had ever known. He was a few hours away from never having to worry about 
money again. 
Zhang Wei checked the access point and refreshed his browser to see the updated 
prices on the assassination market website. Although this iteration was far more advanced 
than the first assassination market hosted by Kuabatake Sanjuro on the Dark Net, it 
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followed the same basic principles.104 The modern version of the assassination market— 
also hosted on an uncategorized, unlisted, Internet site—could be accessed through a 
distinct web browser.105 Users of the site could trust that their identities would be difficult 
to determine, aided by multi-stage processes and advanced encryption technologies to 
ensure user anonymity.106 Zhang Wei even liked that the new site retained the name of its 
predecessor, ensuring that its legacy was preserved. The current assassination market 
worked in the same manner as the first site: anyone could nominate a person to be killed 
with the prediction of the date that the person would die. 
Zhang Wei had been watching the market for many months before he had 
developed his plan. Most of the targets on the site were political figures, politicians, and 
celebrities. Zhang Wei could not care less about any of them, and he had moved to the 
United States to study at one of California’s most prestigious research universities. He had 
been certain he would make his fortune in Silicon Valley, but he soon became disillusioned 
with his life there. The work was hard, the hours were long, and the competition was 
intense. Zhang Wei had quickly realized that he did not want to follow the pathway of his 
classmates; he could reach his goals for financial independence by applying his intellect in 
other ways. 
His assassination plan had started nine months ago when he noticed that the Mayor 
of Los Angeles was on the assassination market. Someone had nominated the mayor to the 
market following his keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention. Many 
political pundits considered the mayor a future presidential candidate, and his political 
views on gun control, immigration rights, and healthcare reform were polarizing public 
opinion about his potential candidacy. Immediately following the mayor’s subsequent 
interview with one of the Sunday talk shows, during which he had called for the 
abolishment of the several constitutional amendments, the pledges on the assassination 
market for his murder started to grow. When the combined value of the mayor’s death 
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reached Zhang Wei’s threshold, he realized he was capable of committing the murder on 
the prescribed day without anyone knowing he was involved. Zhang Wei did not have 
anything against the mayor; he generally disliked all politicians regardless of their 
positions. However, this mayor’s political future had ensured that he was a valuable 
commodity, and Zhang Wei knew he was capable of cashing in. 
After confirming the value of the mayor’s assassination, he moved onto his weapon 
system. The real genesis of Zhang Wei’s attack planning had not begun on the assassination 
market; rather, it had been ignited in his computer ethics class. His professor had been 
lecturing on the updated United Nations ban on autonomous weapons systems, and the 
class had been reviewing the various arguments for and against the ban. Zhang Wei had 
always laughed at the first commitments to ban autonomous weapons systems as only 
countries that lacked the ability to design the systems had signed on.107 To Zhang Wei, the 
debate on nations developing autonomous weapons systems seemed meaningless because 
he knew that he could easily build a weapon system just as deadly as anything that was 
being debated. He also knew that he did not need Department of Defense funding or 
research tools—everything he needed could be easily procured. That realization sparked 
his interest in speeding up his earning potential. 
Zhang Wei reviewed the sport aerial drone in his living room, proud of the simple 
modifications he had made. His drone was popular in the club circles, and many hobbyists 
valued the model for its prolonged flight capabilities and payload capacity. Other models 
that were faster, but speed and maneuverability were unnecessary in Zhang Wei’s plan. 
Because this model also possessed a powerful, high-definition camera—the best on the 
commercial market— even some professional videography companies valued the stock 
model. The system was perfect for Wei’s weaponization plans, affording him the ability to 
showcase his true masterpiece, his targeting software package. 
Zhang Wei had been a gifted computer programmer from a young age, not to 
mention he was able to purchase software from online illicit markets that would serve his 
purpose. Facial recognition software was the first easily acquired software package, and 
107 Scharre, Army of None. 
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Zhang Wei modified it to locate targets more quickly within large crowds. Navigation tools 
that would allow Wei to launch his drown well away from the target location were also 
easy to procure. The most important software had been designed by Zhang Wei himself; 
he had been developing deep-learning algorithms that would allow him to track the mayor’s 
travel patterns and frequent movements. When Wei realized the mayor regularly attended 
professional baseball games, especially on Friday nights, he knew the plan would likely 
succeed. The mayor’s propensity to attend baseball games after a long workweek in an 
open-air stadium makes a predictable, attractive target for the drone attack. 
The last component—the improvised explosive payload—had been the easiest to 
build but perhaps the most stressful part of the plan. Components were readily available, 
and Wei learned how to build the device from easily accessible online forums. He elected 
for simplicity: his drone was outfitted with a small explosive device with metal ball 
bearings. If he could get his drone within 50 meters of the target, he would likely be 
successful. The cover of a night baseball game at Dodgers Stadium would allow for the 
drone to approach the stadium easily, loiter above the stadium lights as it searched for its 
target, and then drop down quickly to finish its attack programming. 
Confident that he had finished all pre-attack preparations, Wei powered down his 
computer equipment and began to pack. He would fly the next morning from Los Angeles 
to Thailand and watch the news for the results of his attack. While driving from San 
Francisco to Los Angeles, Wei deposited his homemade, weaponized drone in a secluded 
nature reserve, approximately 15 miles east of Chavez Ravine and Dodgers Stadium. At 
the predetermined hour, the drone would turn itself on and begin its flight toward Dodgers 
Stadium in search of its target. The drone would hover for approximately 20 minutes 
searching for the mayor. If the drone located the mayor, it would automatically begin its 
attack run. If the drone could not find the mayor, it would turn west and fly toward Hawaii 
until it lost battery power and crashed at sea. 
Knowing his attack had a high likelihood of being successful, Wei planned never 
to return to his apartment or the United States. However, if the attack failed and the drone 
crashed into the Pacific Ocean, he would return from his vacation and begin working on 
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his next assassination target. Fortunately, there were plenty of targets available, and Zhang 
Wei was confident that eventually, his hard work would pay off. 
B. SCENARIO 2: DEEPFAKES 
Victor reviewed the video again, checking shifts in the light as the faces moved in 
front of the wide-angle camera. This was a critical aspect of proving the footage was 
authentic.108 On a separate screen, Victor checked the audio quality and the tempo of the 
speakers. His main target had a slower speech pattern than most Americans, so Victor had 
to account for what would likely be pauses in the dialogue. He stopped the footage and 
pressed back from his computer screens. The video quality was excellent. You could 
clearly see his target speaking with two associates in the hotel room. The critical phrases 
about immigrants were clear and easy to hear. The video would likely shock anyone who 
saw it. The chief executive officer (CEO) of one of the most popular coffee brands in the 
world had been caught on camera disparaging immigrants from Latin America and Africa. 
If the footage were realized on the Internet, it would be devastating in the public arena and 
have an immediate impact on the CEO’s reputation and his company’s brand. However, 
Victor still had to overcome perhaps the hardest challenge of his plan. The footage, 
although virtually impossible to disapprove, was a fake and a product of advanced 
computer algorithms and hundreds of hours of videos of the CEO’s public-speaking 
events.109 Victor was aware that the CEO had been traveling in Europe over the last several 
weeks, could have been in a hotel room, and could have made the comments to associates. 
How would the CEO respond to Victor’s threat to release the video on a number of 
decentralized social media platforms?110 
Victor returned to the Dark Net forums, reading various threads and discussions on 
new tools. A decade earlier, pioneers in deepfake footage—images or videos that combine 
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and superimpose different visual and audio files to create new, false videos—attempted to 
embarrass celebrities by placing their likenesses onto adult film actors.111 Victor was a big 
fan of those classic “artists,” but he viewed himself as more business savvy. Why go 
through all the effort of making a high-quality fake video that digital forensics and image 
analysis could not detect if you were not going to make a profit from your efforts?112 
Today, Victor was using an advancement in video-retargeting technology, which made the 
creation of his videos quick and cost-effective.113 But Victor realized he could not focus 
on his profits yet; he needed to ensure that his fake video would have the required effect. 
He reread the email he had drafted and double-checked the payment instructions. Victor’s 
criminal scheme was predicated on the belief that the CEO would realize the damage the 
fake video might cause and would elect to pay Victor to prevent him from releasing the 
footage. The amount Victor was asking for was a substantial sum of money to be paid via 
a virtual currency not easily tracked. Victor was betting that the CEO would realize the 
greater potential risk of the footage being released. 
Despite the countless hours spent creating the deepfake video, Victor realized the 
whole operation would hinge on how the CEO reacted to the demands in the ransom note. 
Victor’s terms were direct—payment within 72 hours of receipt of the email or he would 
ensure that the footage would go viral. The note also suggested the footage was real so as 
not to tip the authorities off to its lack of authenticity or the means by which it was created. 
His scheme was built on the premise that someone could have secretly filmed the CEO 
making the offensive remarks, and Victor was betting on the premise that society would 
believe the CEO was capable of saying the things heard in the video. 
Victor reviewed the draft email to the CEO’s personal email address one last time 
and then sent the message. Victor powered off the computer equipment, unplugged the 
multiple routers, and surveyed the apartment. The room was not his, and he doubted that 
                                                 
111 Farokhmanesh, “Is It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face?”; and Meserole and Polyakova, “The West Is 
Ill-Prepared.” 
112 Farokhmanesh., “Is It Legal to Swap Someone’s Face?” 
113 Rose Eilenberg, “Beyond Deep Fakes: CMU Method Transfers Style from One Video to Another,” 
University Wire, September 18, 2018, ProQuest. 
39 
he would need to stay with his friend again. As he departed the building and began his walk 
toward the train station, he looked around his home city of Zagreb, Croatia. He would soon 
fly to Zurich and then to Southeast Asia. Traveling would give the CEO plenty of time to 
consider the choice that Victor had given him and Victor time to avoid potential law 
enforcement complications. If all worked well, in a week, Victor would be a rich man and 
could start working on his next deepfake extortion scheme.  
C. SCENARIO 3: IDENTITY THEFT 
Rick awoke later than normal and checked the display on his phone. He would have 
to leave for the airport soon, but there was still time to validate the work he had performed 
last night. He was confident it would work, but he was prone to make mistakes when he 
was tired or rushed. Rick powered on his laptop and reviewed the seven profiles of his 
latest targets. All of them lived in the United States and had access to information he 
wanted—information that could be profitable if he but gain access to their accounts and 
bypass their employers’ security protocols. The challenge in Rick’s work was crafting the 
emails he sent his targets, as he would have to persuade them to willingly turn over PII 
without raising their suspicion. Rick did not have the time to attack the computer networks 
of the victims’ employers. Instead, he wanted to attack the most vulnerable part of the 
computer networks—the users themselves.114 
In an earlier era, cybercriminals like Rick called his tactic spear phishing—the 
collection and use of information specifically relevant to the target to create a customized  
façade—and victims often fell prey to emails claiming to be a from their respective banks, 
employers, or other trusted entities.115 More broadly, Rick’s tactics fell into the category 
of social engineering, and he was excellent at manipulating his victims into revealing 
confidential and personal information.116 As a teenager, Rick had idolized notorious 
cybercriminals and hackers, marveling at their abilities to circumvent security barriers via 
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social-engineering tactics. His hero, Kevin Mitnick, had been one of the most famous 
hackers in the 1990s and had hacked into phone companies, federal agencies, and numerous 
private companies.117 Although Rick’s social-engineering techniques were far more 
sophisticated than anything Mitnick had ever used, they relied on the same principles of 
behavioral-science research and the belief that people fundamentally want to be liked.118 
Rick had built on the social-engineering processes and philosophies of the 
cybercriminals that came before him by leveraging deep-learning algorisms to build 
complex profiles of his potential victims. Decades earlier, cybercriminals used discarded 
phone records and bank statements in garbage dumpsters.119 In today’s era of cybercrime, 
Rick’s targeting software could piece together publicly available information, social media 
activity, and media reporting to help him craft tools to steal the identities of his victims. 
Additionally, Rick leveraged advanced machine-learning services on Dark Net market 
places to test and validate code in his tools.120 
Cybercriminals like Rick could use the identities of their victims for many 
purposes—mostly financial crimes. Rick’s first identity-theft crimes had been simple; he 
had stolen credit card numbers and posted them on illicit online forums. Those basic crimes 
had netted Rick a steady illicit income in the hacking world. As Rick matured, he realized 
there were easier ways to make more money if he were patient and found targets that had 
access to profitable information. 
The alarm clock on Rick’s phone buzzed, announcing that he had to hail a cab 
within 30 minutes if he wanted to arrive at the airport in time for his flight. He slowly and 
methodically reviewed the seven emails to his potential victims and sent each in turn. Each 
email was concise, no longer than one paragraph. They were tailored to each victim and 
contained multiple personal references that were designed to generate a friendly response 
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(see Figure 4). All of the emails simply asked for the victim to click on a website or an 
email hyperlink. The victims would likely never realize that if they accessed the link in 
Rick’s emails, he would gain access to their hard drives.121 Once he gained access, Rick 
could launch additional software applications that data-mined for information he could sell 
on illicit online marketplaces. Protected intellectual property, copyrighted files, proprietary 
research, and PII would garner high prices depending on the source of information. 
 
Figure 4. Sample Spear Phishing Email 
Rick powered down the laptop, stored his other electronics, and grabbed his coat. 
His flight to Greece would provide ample time for at least a few of his victims to access 
the phishing email. After he landed in Athens, he would begin data-mining the information 
he had gained access to and look for the most profitable information. It would be a slow 
process and take time to research what he uncovered. However, if he was methodical and 
diligent, he knew that he would find some valuable nuggets to sell. In the end, a few days 
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of work and research, mostly performed by deep-learning software, would yield substantial 
profits and allow Rick to continue his criminal activities. 
D. SCENARIO 4: VIRTUAL KIDNAPPING 
Carlos awoke to the sounds of the ocean and the warm sea breeze blowing through 
the wooden shutters of his beachside hotel room. It had been a productive two weeks; the 
time away in Costa Rica had helped him focus on his part-time profession. Carlos generally 
enjoyed his day job as a computer programmer in the San Francisco Bay Area, but he had 
never adjusted to the stress and pressure of the startup industry. Every startup was striving 
to be the next big technology firm or to develop the latest gadget everyone had to have. 
Carlos knew there were much easier ways to earn money. He had also come to realize that 
his part-time job was only partially about the money. He enjoyed the action and the thrill 
of the heist. As a kid, he had loved the old western movies his grandfather used to watch, 
especially the train robberies or stagecoach heists. Carlos imagined that the money was 
merely part of the thrill; the excitement of the robbery must have motivated the bad guys. 
Carlos fancied himself a modern version of a train robber except, instead of guns or 
explosives, his weapons were software, his ingenuity, and the stupidity of his victims for 
posting so much of their personal lives on cyberspace portals. 
Although the sun was breaking over the horizon, Carlos had much to accomplish 
before heading to the airport and flying back to California. He wanted to complete all 
criminal activity in Central America and dispose of all potential computer forensics that 
could connect him to his crimes. He reviewed the three targets and was confident that his 
threats on their lives would be convincing. Carlos had worked diligently to develop deep-
learning computer algorithms that were capable of scanning various social media sites for 
new targets. Carlos took advantage of young college kids, usually women at expensive 
colleges and universities, with parents who were likely to pay to keep their children safe. 
He had built his own targeting software that searched through social media posts, pictures, 
and geolocation tags to build social networks of his potential targets. Building his tool had 
taken him almost two years, but all of that work was beginning to pay off. 
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Carlos’s deep-learning tool had produced the intended results and could find 
potential targets based on the information his victims freely posted online. Carlos had 
gotten the idea for virtual kidnapping after hearing about how one of his cousins in Mexico 
had been victimized. In his cousin’s case, Mexican criminal organizations had physically 
surveilled the family for months before they sent his aunt and uncle pictures of their son 
and threatened to kill him if a ransom was not paid. Carlos realized there was no need to 
surveil anyone; all that he needed was available—if you knew how to compile the 
information and find the patterns. 
His victims fit a specific criterion, and his algorithms found college students who 
attended one of 23 U.S. universities within 100 miles of the southwest U.S. border. The 
victims were from wealthy families, had traveled to Mexico in the last nine months, and 
checked into public locations via social media at least four times per week. The victim’s 
use of social media was critical to building the profiles, and geotags of their locations were 
vital to anticipating where they would likely be in the future. The ability to build a virtual 
pattern of life for his victims enabled Carlos to make his threats so convincingly. 
Carlos had spent almost as much time drafting the threatening emails as he had 
building the software to develop his likely targets. Carlos had only a few lines to convey 
his threats, in a manner that would compel the victims’ parents to make immediate 
payments rather than contact law enforcement authorities. Carlos needed to convey two 
important points in his ransom letters: the victims’ social media activity had made it easy 
for him to find them, and he was more than capable of doing despicable things to the 
victims if the ransom was not paid. In addition to building target profiles based on social 
media activity, Carlos was also able to convince families of how dangerous he could be 
using social media postings from some of Mexico’s most notorious cartel hitmen.122 Carlos 
would ensure that the victims’ parents would receive some of the latest footage of cartel 
violence when he sent his ransom notes.  




Time was running short, and Carlos double-checked the three victims and the 
ransom letters for each, which contained the same threat and claimed to be authored by a 
prominent Mexico-based criminal organization. The letters were concise, contained 
accurate personal information about the victims, predicted where the victims would be, and 
threatened to kidnap the victim if a large ransom was not paid within 96 hours of the receipt 
of the message. All of the victims’ parents—the recipients of Carlos’s letters—were 
extremely wealthy and had no notable connections to U.S. law enforcement. Perhaps they 
would pay the ransom, but it really did not matter. The victims were not in any real danger, 
and Carlos had no intention or capability of actually harming them. But their parents did 
not know that. 
Carlos was confident in his work and sent the emails to parents of the three victims. 
After verifying that the messages were sent, he powered off the computer and withdrew 
the external storage device containing all of the victims’ targeting information. All of his 
software had been developed on his vacation, so there was no evidence of his work at home 
in California. He put the computer and storage device in a bag and headed down to the 
beach. He borrowed one of the resort kayaks and took to the surf for his morning paddle, 
just as he had done every morning of his vacation. After 20 minutes and about 500 yards 
from the shoreline, he began dropping his computer hardware into the ocean. He had 
already deleted the data, but the salt water would soon destroy all of the hardware and 
remove any traces of his activity. As he turned back toward the beach resort, he began 
thinking about how he would spend the ransom money he was likely to earn. He would 
wait for months, maybe years, before he would access any of the ransom money, which 
was to be paid via cryptocurrency. The wait did not matter—Carlos had time and plenty of 
potential new victims to find. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
AI-enabled cybercrime is likely to present new and more complicated challenges 
for the homeland security enterprise in the coming years. The four scenarios in this chapter 
projected potential threats on the horizon that require an examination of how law 
enforcement officials and policymakers will confront cybercrime. The next chapters 
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explore potential tactical responses to the threats highlighted in the scenarios and analyze 
how law enforcement officials can prepare for the future malicious use of AI. 
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IV. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 
When the past is always with you, it may as well be present; and if it is 
present, it will be future as well. 
  —William Gibson, Neuromancer123 
 
Although many of the challenges highlighted in the four scenarios may be on the 
distant horizon, law enforcement strategies that are used today may be suitable for 
responding to future AI-enabled cybercrimes. Moreover, law enforcement and intelligence 
officials must continuingly educate themselves on emerging AI technologies and their 
potential for malicious use.124 The law enforcement strategy of intelligence-led policing 
(ILP)—a decision-making process that uses criminal intelligence analysis to reduce crime 
and measure the effectiveness of policing strategies—can be applied to efforts to combat 
AI-enabled cybercrime.125 Law enforcement officials will ultimately need to identify 
individuals suspected of committing future cybercrimes, and investigations that 
successfully lead to prosecutions and convictions will be an important deterrence. Crimes 
committed using malicious AI will test law enforcement officials in new ways, so enhanced 
interagency cooperation will be vital to responding to new criminal threats. Finally, the 
virtual nature of cybercrime challenges physical jurisdictions, so law enforcement officials 
will need to rely on international partnerships to build effective investigations.126 This 
chapter discusses how law enforcement officials can learn about emerging AI technologies 
and how they can adapt existing law enforcement tactics and strategies to confront future 
AI-enabled cybercrimes. 
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A. EDUCATING LAW ENFORCEMENT ON CYBERCRIME AND 
EMERGING AI TECHNOLOGIES 
The current cybercrime environment already presents complex challenges for 
public security officials, and these challenges will be further complicated if cybercriminals 
adapt AI to their operations. Many law enforcement agencies question their roles in 
investigating cybercrime, and developing the necessary technical expertise can be 
challenging.127 In one study, researchers found that many local law enforcement officials 
lacked not only adequate training to police cybercrime but also a strong interest in 
developing the expertise required.128 The same study concluded that the general profile of 
law enforcement officials who are interested in investigating cybercrime are older, have 
little to no previous computer training, and believe that cybercrime is an important issue 
for their departments.129 Interest in learning about AI technologies and their potential use 
by cybercriminals will likely be an important factor when law enforcement and intelligence 
managers determine which personnel to assign to malicious AI-related investigations. 
Although training on artificial intelligence technology may be acquired via books, 
classroom instruction, and other traditional training methods, some technologies may 
require other non-traditional training methods. In the deepfake scenario, Victor was able 
to build false videos from tools he likely learned about online and via hobby forums. 
Today’s deepfake videos are often created by amateurs, and making fake videos of 
celebrities may not violate current laws.130 Law enforcement officials, assigned to 
investigate extortion or cyberbullying crimes related to deepfakes, can develop expertise 
by joining online forums and participating in amateur video creation. 
The autonomous weapon system scenario may also be a situation for which law 
enforcement can prepare via hobby clubs although formal drone pilot training is available 
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for a wide variety of legitimate applications.131 Although the scenario included an AI-
enhanced targeting system, law enforcement officials are researching ways to enforce no-
fly areas and methods to safely capture drones that present a public safety threat.132 Law 
enforcement officials gain expertise easily on drone operations by attending training and 
staying abreast of changing legal requirements that may be issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration. 
Law enforcement and intelligence officials may also be able to leverage 
partnerships with private industry to develop expertise on the technologies being used by 
cybercriminals. Several successful partnership models currently exist, and law 
enforcement and the intelligence community could use relationships from Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) to maintain awareness of emerging AI 
technology.133 According to their National Council, there are 20 sector-specific ISACs, 
that support the nation’s critical infrastructure and provide information and analytic 
capabilities to both the private sector and government.134 In particular, the Financial 
Services ISAC and the Research and Education Networking ISAC have provided 
actionable information to help mitigate threats to their respective business operations.135 
B. ADAPTING ILP TO THE MALICIOUS AI THREAT 
The concept of ILP was first referenced in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s. 
The National Criminal Intelligence Service lists four elements of effective intelligence-led 
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policing: targeting offenders, managing crime and insecurity in hotspots, investing in series 
of crimes and attacks that are linked, and applying preventive measures by working with 
local communities to reduce crime levels.136 ILP is a collaborative process that begins with 
gathering a wide range of information and analyzing it for patterns of common activities 
to better understand the criminal environment.137 From its inception, ILP has been an 
evolving concept that offers opportunities for adaptation as the criminal environment 
changes.138 A review of how many law enforcement agencies use ILP strategies may offer 
insights into how these processes can be employed to combat malicious AI in future 
cybercrimes. 
Many law enforcement agencies leverage a form of the CompStat performance 
management system—short for computer comparison statistics—as part of their ILP 
strategies.139 CompStat, first developed by the New York City Police Department in the 
early 1990s, uses timely intelligence to deploy resources rapidly to high-crime areas to 
reduce crime.140 The CompStat process empowers commanders to achieve their crime 
reduction goals and provides higher-echelon commanders the ability to show 
accountability for how resources are deployed.141 CompStat begins with senior leaders 
establishing performance metrics for reducing crime in their areas of responsibility and 
investing in computer analytic capabilities that record and analyze crime data from across 
the respective jurisdiction.142 Data are collected and analyzed, often on a weekly basis, and 
then sent to operational-level decision-makers to adjust their enforcement tactics to achieve 
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reduction goals for organizational crime.143 CompStat’s reliance on data analysis is an 
important aspect to consider when evaluating how to apply it to AI-enabled future 
cybercrimes. If law enforcement agencies that rely on CompStat to drive their ILP 
strategies are going to confront malicious AI, then capturing data for timely analysis will 
be an important investigative requirement. 
If ILP and the CompStat process begin with establishing organizational goals, then 
law enforcement officials will need to gather data and intelligence on malicious AI-enabled 
cybercrime. In scenario three, Rick uses deep-learning AI to develop detailed patterns of 
life of his potential victims for spear phishing attacks. Although Rick’s tools are 
hypothetical, the process of social engineering has been used by criminals committing 
identity theft for decades.144 By examining how law enforcement currently investigates the 
interrelationship of identity-related crime, Internet crime, and fraud, we can identify the 
types of data and reporting that are needed for investigating AI-related crime.145  
143 Walsh. 
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Figure 5. The Interrelationship between Transnational Crime, Identity 
Crime, Cybercrime, and Fraud146 
Figure 5 highlights the overlapping nature of these crimes for the purposes of 
reporting requirements and data needed for a CompStat model. In scenario three, Rick 
sends spear phishing emails to seven potential victims. Law enforcement officials should 
examine the digital forensics of any successful or unsuccessful phishing attack to help 
develop indicators of criminal activity. 
In scenarios one and three, the assailants used the Dark Net and online illicit 
markets to support their illegal activities. Law enforcement and intelligence officials would 
need effective methods for monitoring activities on these forums to develop a baseline 
model for measuring change. Unfortunately, the monitoring of online illicit markets—
where personal information gathered via phishing attacks is likely sold—is extremely 
difficult, and online scraping tools used to measure activity have shortcomings.147 
Additionally, when law enforcement has been able to disrupt online illicit markets, as the 
                                                 
146 Source: K.-K. R. Choo and R. G. Smith, “Criminal Exploitation of Online Systems by Organised 
Crime Groups, “Asian Criminology 3 (2008): 37–59. 
147 Heath-Ferguson, “Offline ‘Stranger’ and Online Lurker.” 
53 
FBI did with the Silk Road market in 2013, other markets quickly arise as replacements.148 
If law enforcement investigators are going to effectively police future AI-enabled 
cybercrime, developing an understanding of illegal activity on the Dark Net will be vital. 
Law enforcement agencies are increasingly embracing forms of open-source 
intelligence (OSINT) as an effective tool for gathering information about online criminal 
activities.149 OSINT is generally defined as intelligence collected from sources—such as 
academic publications, newspapers, social media, and publicly available information—that 
are open and accessible to the general public.150 Some law enforcement agencies actively 
use OSINT in their investigations of violent crimes and are attempting to use social media 
monitoring as a way to anticipate future crimes.151 As cybercriminals embrace AI software 
in their activities, law enforcement officials could explore OSINT capabilities and 
determine how best to integrate OSINT into their enforcement operations. 
C. ENVIRONMENT OF AI-ENABLED CYBERCRIME 
Present-day cybercriminals operate on the Dark Net, which is a smaller aspect of 
the deep web. The deep web contains about 90 to 94 percent of total online content 
including sites that are not cataloged or indexed.152 The deep web includes all content that 
Google and other search engines have not indexed and for which they cannot return search 
results.153 The deep web also hosts a wide range of legitimate and private data ranging from 
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corporate intranets to academic journals to social media databases.154 The Dark Net is a 
subset of the deep web and has been used for the promotion and distribution of illegal 
activities.155 
The deep web and the Dark Net are most often accessed via special search engines 
that utilize a TOR browser.156 The TOR browser, designed by the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory, allows for anonymous communications leveraging networks of voluntary 
nodes that route and encrypt web traffic.157 TOR conceals communications by selecting 
random relay nodes to form a complete pathway.158 This process builds a multi-layered 
encryption method that makes tracking web traffic extremely difficult.159 The deep web 
and Dark Net can also be accessed by lesser-used methods such as I2P and Freenet. I2P 
was designed as an anonymous peer-to-peer communication pathway that can run a 
traditional Internet service while Freenet, a predecessor of I2P, uses an unstructured 
overlay network to protect communications.160 
Criminals leverage online illicit markets to support a wide range of illegal activities 
including the smuggling of humans, narcotics, stolen goods, weapons, PII, and intellectual 
property.161 The Dark Net of today also offers criminals a wide range of tutorials on how 
to conduct illicit online activities, and the professional criminal hacking group 
ShadowCrew offers criminal tutorials on everything from credit card-cloning to the use of 
cryptography.162 Future cybercriminals will likely continue to use the Dark Net in their 
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illicit activities, so law enforcement officials will need to identify lead information if they 
are to investigate AI-enabled cybercrime successfully. 
ILP begins with identifying criminal activities, but measuring and analyzing 
criminal activities via online illicit markets is extremely challenging given the cryptology, 
privacy measures, and other security protocols being employed on the Dark Net. Online 
illicit markets use mitigation technologies that make it possible to sell illegal products all 
over the world and are difficult for law enforcement officials to detect.163 Markets that 
specialize in drugs sales on the Dark Net use advanced digital encryption to anonymize the 
buyers and sellers.164 Some markets have also decentralized their structure, further 
complicating law enforcement efforts to investigate and interdict illegal activities.165 The 
very nature of the Dark Net, with unknowable realms of password-protected sites, 
uncategorized websites, and hidden content, provides a space where users can remain 
hidden.166 Further complicating investigative efforts, TOR recently added a layer of 
privacy that makes identifying a website host nearly impossible.167 If law enforcement 
officials are to apply their departmental ILP strategies to criminal activities that take place 
on the Dark Net, they will have to overcome these challenges and identify methods for 
drawing criminals out of the shadows. 
D. IDENTIFYING PERPETRATORS OF AI-ENABLED CYBERCRIME 
In 2013, the FBI successfully arrested the owner of one of the most famous online 
illicit markets on the Dark Net using traditional law enforcement strategies. Beginning in 
2011, undercover FBI agents began purchasing illegal goods on the Silk Road, a TOR-
based hidden site that allowed users to buy and sell illicit narcotics.168 The FBI also used 
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undercover agents to pose as assassins and other criminal actors in their investigation into 
the Silk Road’s ringleader, Ross Ulbricht.169 The investigation was a huge success, 
resulting in arrests in the United States, the U.K., Sweden, Ireland, Australia, and the 
Netherlands, and the FBI seized approximately $150 million in bitcoin.170 The takedown 
of the Silk Road and Ulbricht also showed that if law enforcement is aware of an online 
illicit market, it can work with international partners to effectively disrupt and dismantle 
the criminal enterprise. 
Many law enforcement agencies currently confront crime on the Dark Net by 
adopting practices and techniques of cybercriminals and the hacking community. Some 
departments have used widely available and published hacking techniques to help penetrate 
the layers of anonymity provided by the TOR browser.171 In 2012, the FBI used the 
Metasploit application to identify the cybercriminals responsible for posting and accessing 
child pornography on the Dark Net.172 In 2014, the FBI also participated in an international, 
multi-agency investigation codenamed Operation Onymous that used hacking tactics and 
employed malware.173 Although these tactics have proven successful in identifying 
cybercriminals on the Dark Net, they do raise ethical and privacy concerns that law 
enforcement officials will have to consider. Privacy advocates are concerned about 
potential breaches of First Amendment–protected online speech and how law enforcement 
monitors the Internet and social media.174 Law enforcement officials will have to consider 
the privacy implications of using hacking tools, so operations are conducted within legal 
frameworks that protect individuals’ freedom of speech. 
                                                 
169 Bartlett, loc. 140. 
170 Bartlett. 
171 Andrew Mckinnon, Hacking: Ultimate Hacking for Beginners, How to Hack (Scotts Valley, CA: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2015), 43. 
172 Metasploit is a penetration-testing platform that allows users to find, test, and validate 
vulnerabilities. In the cited example, the FBI used this tool to penetrate the Dark Web browser and 
determine the identities of individuals who had posted child pornography online. Sui, Caverlee, and 
Rudesill, The Deep Web and the Darknet. 
173 Sui, Caverlee, and Rudesill. 
174 Rottman, “Open Source Intelligence and Crime Prevention.” 
57 
Law enforcement officials have also partnered with private industry to develop 
tools for conducting forensic research on the Dark Net and for following the transactions 
of the cryptocurrencies that form the financial backbone of illicit markets. TOR browser 
activities can be examined in several ways; security researchers can examine registry 
changes, network forensics, and the memories of seized computer hard drives.175 Law 
enforcement can also examine cryptocurrency transactions, and Internet Evidence Finder, 
for example, has the ability to recover artifacts from Bitcoin transactions.176 Academia and 
private research institutions can also assist in identifying cybercrime, and some scholars 
have advocated for additional research into the recognition of technology-enabled crime.177 
Dark Net scraping tools can also capture user activity although this method of research has 
proven extremely time-consuming, and cybercriminals have adapted to detection 
methods.178 Law enforcement and security officials will need to focus on understanding 
and mapping the illegal activity that transpires on the Dark Net if they are to develop 
detection methods for combatting AI-enhanced cybercrime. 
E. INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS TO 
INVESTIGATE MALICIOUS AI 
The FBI’s investigation and subsequent arrest of Ross Ulbricht and closure of the 
Silk Road demonstrated the criticality of working across multiple jurisdictions and with 
international partners. In all four of the fictional scenarios, the criminal actors cross real 
and virtual borders, using international travel as a means for avoiding law enforcement 
detection. Present-day cybercriminals benefit from difficulties in tracing their online 
activities and the challenges in prosecuting them when their activities cross international 
boundaries.179 If law enforcement officials are to successfully investigate AI-enabled 
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cybercrime, they will almost certainly need to partner with domestic agencies as well as 
international organizations. 
At the federal government level, the FBI leads the National Cyber Investigative 
Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), which brings together more than 20 partner agencies.180 The 
task force approach to investigating cybercrime allows federal agencies to leverage their 
respective authorities to maximize their effectiveness and ensure that criminals face the 
most severe penalties possible. At the state and local levels, fusion centers are uniquely 
positioned to support cybercrime investigations by promoting information-sharing, 
analyzing data, and disseminating conclusions from completed investigations to a wide 
audience.181 In 2015, fusion centers in Florida, Louisiana, and Southern California shared 
information on a sex-trafficking ring that led to the arrest of three individuals.182 This 
collaboration shows the need for effective information sharing across law enforcement 
jurisdictions to investigate cybercrime successfully. 
At the international level, the International Crime Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(EUROPOL) support investigations that span multiple law enforcement jurisdictions. In its 
2018 threat assessment on Internet-organized crime, EUROPOL highlights the importance 
of collaborating with law enforcement, the private sector, and academia to combat 
cybercrime.183 The report also notes that emerging technologies such as artificial 
intelligence will challenge law enforcement capabilities and that security personnel should 
focus on understanding how AI will impact future crime. INTERPOL has also developed 
the Global Complex for Innovation to focus on identification of criminal activities as well 
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as support partner agencies with training and in operations.184 As emerging technology 
develops, international partnerships will be vital in effectively investigating and 
determining attribution in AI-enhanced cybercrime. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is unclear when law enforcement will be confronted with the situations described 
in the four scenarios, but today’s enforcement tactics can be used to investigate future AI-
enabled cybercrimes. Public security officials will need to focus on education and 
awareness of how emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, will affect future 
crime. ILP is a doctrine that enables decision-making, and its application should be 
continued when combating cybercrime. Law enforcement investigations will also remain 
a vital tool in confronting cybercriminals, and identifying suspects in obscure regions of 
the Dark Net will be paramount to dismantling crime syndicates. The homeland security 
enterprise will need to share information effectively, both domestically and internationally, 
to investigate cybercrime.  
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V. STRATEGY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Humanity does not ask us to be happy. It merely asks us to be brilliant on 
its behalf.  
 —Orson Scott Card, Enders Game185 
 
Each of the four scenarios presents a multitude of challenges for strategic planners 
and policymakers as they consider how best to confront the malicious use of AI. In scenario 
one, Zhang Wei plots an assassination and gathers software tools to help facilitate his attack 
via the Dark Net. In scenario two, Victor—based in Croatia—uses publicly available video 
and audio to blackmail a U.S. citizen. In scenario three, Rick leverages AI and deep-
learning technologies to build advanced spear phishing attacks based on the social media 
postings of his potential victims. In scenario four, Carlos also uses AI and deep-learning 
tools to develop complete patterns of life for his American victims and social media 
postings to kidnap them virtually. In all scenarios, the assailants are in other countries or, 
in the case of Zhang Wei, seeking to travel to locations where U.S. authorities will have 
difficulty tracking them. An examination of these scenarios highlights specific areas that 
need strategic focus and policy considerations. 
The four scenarios highlight possible future threats that policymakers and strategic 
planners will likely encounter, and it would be prudent to start asking questions today that 
shape future strategies. Of the potential questions that a policymaker could ask, the 
following three questions would likely shape any policy or strategy designed to defeat the 
malicious use of AI by cybercriminals. 
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(1) What elements need to exist in a cybercrime strategy? 
(2) How can we work with international partners to arrest and prosecute 
cybercriminals? 
(3) How can we work with private industry to understand the implications and 
potential malicious uses of emerging technologies? 
The process of reviewing these initial questions can help determine what elements 
are needed in any new strategies or what changes need to be made to existing strategic 
frameworks. Prior to making recommendations for any changes, it is prudent to review 
existing U.S. cybersecurity strategies and examine where any current caps may lie. Policy 
makers and strategic planners should also review how foreign partners have confronted the 
cybercrime threat and which international relationships can benefit U.S. efforts to combat 
cybercrime. This chapter examines how the United Kingdom, France, and Australia are 
combatting cybercrime and what lessons learned can be drawn from their experiences. 
B. U.S. CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES 
In all four of the scenarios, the criminals leverage cyberspace to research and 
develop their attack plans. At the national level, the Bush, Obama, and Trump 
administrations issued cybersecurity strategies that outline frameworks for protecting U.S. 
national interests in cyberspace. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued by 
the Bush Administration in February 2003, outlines five strategic priorities to reduce cyber 
threats through training, international partnerships, and engagement with the private 
sector.186 The International Strategy for Cyberspace, issued by the Obama administration 
in May 2001, outlines guiding principles for the United States and establishes distinct 
policy priorities for the government.187 The National Cyber Strategy of the United States 
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of America, issued in September 2018 by the Trump Administration, emphasizes 
strengthening U.S. economic and security interests by investing in cyber defense.188 
The Bush administration’s strategy aligns with the national strategy for homeland 
security, focusing on building a strategic framework for cybersecurity. The strategy 
extends the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, created during the Clinton 
Administration, and outlines five national priorities for protecting critical infrastructure 
from cybersecurity risks, reducing national vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks, and 
minimizing damage and supporting recovery when cyber-attacks occur.189 While this 
strategy establishes the framework for the new federal homeland security infrastructure, it 
fails to mention cybercrime or criminal activities that are supported in cyberspace. Also, 
the strategy lacks enforcement mechanisms and requires that voluntary compliance actions 
be taken by private-sector companies.190 
The Obama administration’s cybersecurity strategy builds on the infrastructure 
established during the Bush administration and emphasizes partnership-building.191 To 
achieve its objectives, the strategy outlines seven policy priorities and highlights the 
importance of international partnerships and cooperation with foreign governments.192 The 
Obama administration’s strategy, in contrast to the Bush administration’s, specifically 
mentions cybercrime although it only outlines the rules and international laws U.S. law 
enforcement must observe.193 
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The Trump administration’s strategy is the first presidential strategy to focus on 
specific elements of cybercrime and, under its first pillar, to define five priority actions for 
combatting cybercrime and improving incident reporting.194 The strategy calls for private 
industry to provide prompt incident reporting and cites areas where new legislation is 
needed to modernize electronic surveillance and computer crime laws.195 Similar to the 
Bush and Obama administrations’ strategies, the Trump administration’s strategy builds 
on the work of past administrations and lacks mechanisms for ensuring the goals and 
priority actions are carried out.196 Although the strategy was recently released, the fact that 
it is the first to highlight cybercrime indicates a growing sense among policymakers that 
cybercrime is a growing national security threat. 
C. CYBERSECURITY VERSUS CYBERCRIME 
Although the United States has had cybersecurity strategies for decades, No 
presidential strategy focuses solely on cybercrime, nor does one officially define the 
concept.197 Cybercrime, broadly defined as crimes that involve computers and networks, 
has been a growing category of crime for the past two decades that impacts individuals, 
corporations, and governments.198 Emerging technologies and the expanding trend of 
interconnected wireless devices offer new opportunities for cybercriminals to exploit 
growing societal reliance on computer and networked systems. Smartphones, networked 
personal devices, and Internet-connected appliances in our homes offer cybercriminals new 
pathways to attack our personal information.199 Devices that leverage machine-learning 
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technology and artificial intelligence will soon provide cybercriminals access to our 
personal lives and identities.200 Governments around the world are struggling to combat 
the current threats posed by cybercriminals, and significant attention needs focusing in 
these areas if we hope to effectively combat cybercrime in the future.  
It is difficult to measure the magnitude of the threat from cybercrime given the lack 
of a comprehensive dataset on cybercrime incidents.201 According to Symantec 
Corporation, in 2011, cybercrime resulted in total net losses of $388 billion in 24 
countries—although it should be noted that Symantec Corporation offers security 
solutions, its bias may exaggerate the cybercrime threat environment.202 Cybercrime 
transcends international boundaries. Forbes reports that by 2021, cybercrime is estimated 
to have a global financial impact in excess of $6 trillion per year.203 The costs to private 
businesses vary, and according to a study published in 2017 by the Accenture and Ponemon 
Institute, the average cost of cybercrime globally has risen to $11.7 million per 
organization, a 23 percent increase over the previous year.204 Cybercrime, by some 
estimates, yields more illicit profits than international drug trafficking, and on average, 
someone’s identity is stolen every three seconds as a result of cybercrime.205 
A byproduct of research that further complicates an already complicated 
cybercrime environment is the criminal who potentially creates malevolent AI. 
Cybercriminals, motivated by profit, may develop proxy AI systems that mask their 
involvement and avoid risk and responsibility.206 The malicious use of AI could threaten 
digital security, and machines could become as proficient at hacking and social engineering 
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as human cybercriminals.207 The ability to detect cybercriminal attacks from malicious AI 
is predicated on an examination of these technologies and their application to existing 
criminal patterns and activities. Criminals have long demonstrated that they are early 
adopters of new technologies.208 
Cybercrime is a global challenge, and an examination of how other partner nations 
are confronting this epidemic may offer opportunities for reframing U.S. strategies, 
policies, and policing programs. The United Kingdom and France are the fifth and seventh 
largest economies in the world, respectively, according to the International Monetary Fund, 
and an analysis of the policies and strategies of these two nations may offer insights that 
the United States can incorporate into its enforcement practices.209 Additionally, given the 
global nature of cybercrime and transnational organized criminal networks, the United 
States will continue to need partnerships to effectively combat cybercriminal activities.  
D. EXAMINING HOW THE UNITED KINGDOM CONFRONTS 
CYBERCRIME 
The United Kingdom combats cybercrime with a unified organizational 
construction, a single national strategy that governs specific objectives for achieving 
cybersecurity, and a view toward working with private industry to understand how 
criminals will leverage emerging technologies. The United Kingdom’s streamlined 
structure provides for a unified command-and-control apparatus that facilitates 
accountability and measurement of the country’s law enforcement activities. The national 
strategy for cybersecurity also provides a clear understanding of the threats that the United 
Kingdom (UK) faces from cybercrime as well as outlines specific methods for policing and 
engaging with private industry. Identifying both a primary federal agency for cybersecurity 
and a national strategy also provides a single entity through which private industries work 
with UK security partners, so private industry can easily identify agencies to engage in 
efforts to protect their information and report incidents of cybercrime. 
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In the United Kingdom, serious organized crimes—such as money laundering, 
human trafficking, child sex exploitation, and cybercrime—fall under the jurisdiction of 
the National Crime Agency (NCA).210 The NCA, much like its counterterrorism partner 
agency, the Counter Terrorism Command, is based in London and is similar to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation in the United States. The NCA is the national lead for investigating 
cybercriminal activities, working closely with the London Metropolitan Police, the agency 
responsible for cybercrime investigations in the nation’s capital.211 Within the NCA, the 
National Cyber Crime Unit works closely with Regional Organized Crime Units (ROCUs), 
the London Metropolitan Police’s Cyber Crime Unit, other British government agencies, 
international law enforcement partners, and private-sector firms.212 The National Cyber 
Crime Unit also manages the Action Fraud web portal, which is a single access point for 
reporting incidents of cybercrime and computer fraud.213  
The United Kingdom published its updated five-year National Cyber Security 
Strategy in 2016, and the strategy focuses on the themes of defending, deterring, and 
developing as methods for confronting cybercrime.214 The National Cyber Security 
Strategy 2016–2021, written in plain language and without technical jargon, specifically 
outlines cybercrime methods, security vulnerabilities, and strategies for improving 
cybersecurity. The strategy also lays out specific methods in the implementation chapter 
that multiple agencies in the UK government will undertake to achieve the overall strategic 
goals outlined in the document. Moreover, the strategy lays out expectations for 
government agencies, private industries, and individual citizens to combat cybercriminals 
effectively.215 
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In addition to the United Kingdom’s governmental structure and single national 
strategy, the island nation has invested in developing cybersecurity expertise that generates 
institutional knowledge for the British government and private industry. The British 
government has invested in private startup companies as well as the education system to 
develop cybersecurity expertise.216 At the national level, the National Cyber Security 
Centre (NCSC) has private-sector engagement responsibilities to develop the UK’s 
cybersecurity expertise.217 Created in 2016, the NCSC has consolidated four other UK 
organizations with cybersecurity expertise into a single organization to better work with 
government agencies, private industries, and academic institutions.218 
E. EXAMINING HOW FRANCE CONFRONTS CYBERCRIME 
France uses many of the same methods for combatting cybercrime as the United 
Kingdom does, but France has a national cybersecurity strategy with specific objectives, a 
national-level agency for monitoring government computer systems, and a national police 
force with cybercrime investigative responsibilities. France’s national cybersecurity 
strategy bears similarities to the United Kingdom’s strategy; however, France emphasizes 
the importance of leading the European Union’s efforts to protect cyberspace 
proactively.219 Although France has a single national-level agency for protecting 
government computer networks and information systems, several other French agencies 
have cybersecurity authority.220 Perhaps one of the most important distinctions of French 
federal cybersecurity efforts is the amount of emphasis placed on education and the 
development of cybersecurity expertise, not only in France but throughout the European 
Union. France’s cybersecurity strategies, monitoring agencies, and focus on education 
closely adhere to recommendations outlined in a 2012 report from the European Network 
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and Information Security Agency that calls for EU members to develop comprehensive 
cybersecurity strategies.221 
France’s National Digital Security Strategy was signed in 2015, outlining five 
strategic objectives: defend French information networks and critical infrastructure, 
proactively combat cybercrime, institute cybersecurity training throughout all levels of 
education, create an environment that encourages and supports cybersecurity research and 
design in France, and be a driving force in the European Union to promote safe and open 
cyberspace.222 France’s first and second objectives are similar to the United Kingdom’s 
goals under the deter and defend groupings. However, France’s strategy calls for 
cybersecurity education to be a core curriculum from grade-school age into the college 
years of French students.223 France also explicitly outlines its role in the European Union 
and its commitment to lead cybersecurity initiatives for the EU. 
France, similar to the United Kingdom, has established a lead federal agency for 
cybersecurity although other parts of the French state have cybersecurity responsibilities. 
The Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’information (French Network and 
Information Security Agency, or ANSSI) is France’s national authority for cybersecurity, 
and the agency is responsible for preventing and responding to cybersecurity incidents.224 
The French Ministry of Defense also has cybersecurity responsibilities, and in 2017, France 
created a cyber-command structure with responsibilities for integrating digital warfare into 
military operations.225 The French Ministry of the Interior houses the nation’s investigative 
capacities, and the Gendarmerie is the lead federal investigative agency for cybercrime.226 
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France’s cybersecurity structure in some aspects mirrors the U.S. structure for 
cybersecurity with multiple agencies having responsibilities for different aspects of 
cybercrime policy and investigations. 
One unique aspect of the French approach to combatting cybercrime is the 
emphasis on cybersecurity education, training, and development. For several years, France 
reported some of the highest levels of cybercrime in the European Union, which may have 
shaped the country’s focus on education and cyber hygiene techniques. In 2013, the 
cybersecurity firm Symantec reported that 41 percent of French smartphone users had been 
victims of cybercrime compared to 29 percent of other European smartphone users.227 The 
Symantec study prompted the head of ANSSI to declare that lowering incidents of 
cybercrime was critical to the nation’s survival.228 France’s focus on education is likely an 
attempt to increase citizen awareness of cyber hygiene practices that can effectively 
mitigate many vulnerabilities that foster cybercrime. 
France’s emphasis on education and developing an environment that supports 
research and design for Internet technology may help prepare the country from new threats. 
Emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, the growing 
trend of networked devices, and the Internet of things—are likely to expand exploitable 
pathways for cybercriminals. The ability to detect cybersecurity attacks from malicious AI 
is predicated on the examination of these technologies and their application to existing 
criminal patterns and activities. Criminals have long demonstrated that they are early 
adopters of new technologies.229 France’s emphasis on education and partnerships with 
institutions that are developing new technologies will likely give the nation and the 
European Union the opportunity to confront new criminal challenges as they develop. 
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F. WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE UK AND 
FRANCE? 
A review of how the United Kingdom and France are confronting cybercrime offers 
multiple best practices for the United States to consider incorporating into its own strategies 
and cybersecurity initiatives. Unlike the United Kingdom and France, the United States 
lacks a national cybercrime strategy, although multiple cabinet-level agencies have 
established strategies. Also, in contrast to the UK and France and likely due to a lack of 
strategy or doctrine, the United States does not have defined goals or objectives regarding 
how to confront cybercrime. The United States has numerous agencies at the federal, state, 
and local levels that are focused on preventing or responding to cybercrime. However, 
there is not a unity of command or hierarchy for the various agencies to work together to 
confront complex cybersecurity threats. Finally, the United States has many initiatives to 
engage with the private industry and academic institutions to learn about threats from 
emerging technologies. Nevertheless, the United States lacks formal doctrine and unifying 
guidance to ensure that government entities are working closely with technology experts 
to understand threats from emerging technologies. 
G. AUSTRALIA: A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR TRACKING CYBERCRIME 
Australia, like many prosperous countries, has to confront the challenge of 
cybercrime and develop effective methods for targeting cybercriminals. In 2013, Australia 
published its first National Plan to Combat Cybercrime, and on May 19, 2017, the 
Australian Department of Home Affairs agreed to develop a new national plan to tackle 
increasing risks of cybercrime to Australian businesses and citizens.230 In an effort to 
understand and track cybercrime in Australia, the government developed the Australian 
Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN), so the public can securely report 
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instances of cybercrime.231 ACORN is a key initiative under the new National Plan to 
Combat Cybercrime.232 
ACORN is part of a national policing initiative, and multiple Australian agencies 
participated in its design and implementation. All Australian law enforcement agencies 
participate in ACORN as well as the attorney general’s departments; the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority, Australia’s equivalent of the Consumer Protection 
Agency; and the Office of Children’s eSafety Commissioner.233 ACORN captures a wide 
variety of cybercrimes ranging from attacks on computer systems to cyber-bullying to 
identity theft to online child pornography.234 The use of a common reporting platform that 
captures a wide range of cybercrime enables law enforcement, public safety officials, and 
policymakers to develop a comprehensive understanding of crime patterns.  
Australia’s approach to combatting cybercrime offers several good practices that 
could be adopted in the United States. Although Australia is roughly the same size as the 
continental United States, its population is significantly smaller with 89 percent of its 23 
million inhabitants residing in urban areas.235 Australia’s smaller urban population can be 
educated on the government’s public safety strategies via marketing campaigns. 
Advertisements, commercials, and media reporting help provide awareness about the ways 
Australia is confronting cybercrime. General awareness of government strategies and 
enforcement programs also allows for citizens and Australia’s legislative branches to seek 
accountability from federal programs.  
ACORN is one good practice from Australia that the United States could consider 
using as a method for tracking and reporting cybercrime. Currently, in the United States, 
multiple federal agencies have cybercrime responsibilities, and virtually every state has its 
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own cybercrime program. A quick review of the Department of Justice’s website shows 
that depending on the cybercrime, an American citizen would have to contact multiple 
federal investigative law enforcement agencies.236 In contrast, Australia has one online 
platform that all relevant agencies leverage for crime reporting and trend analysis. 
Australian law enforcement agencies likely have a better understanding of cybercrime in 
their country compared to U.S. agencies. 
Australia’s unified national strategy for combatting cybercrime is another good 
practice that could be adopted in the United States. Under Australia’s National Plan to 
Combat Cybercrime, all relevant federal agencies have responsibilities.237 A single 
national strategy ensures that all agencies follow the same plan and are responsible for 
achieving the stated objectives. In contrast, the United States does not have a national 
strategy for combatting cybercrime, at least to the extent that every federal agency is held 
accountable in the same fashion, as in the Australian system.238 In the United States, federal 
law enforcement agencies have separate and often agency-specific strategies. As a result, 
it seems more difficult in the United States to measure the performance of individual 
agencies and their strategies to reduce cybercrime. In Australia, a common strategic focus 
and ACORN provide a mechanism for evaluating how effective the Australian partner 
agencies are at reducing cybercrime. 
Australia has developed a unified approach at combatting cybercrime and an 
efficient method for reporting and tracking cybercriminal activity. Australia’s National 
Plan to Combat Cybercrime appears to be an effective mechanism for bringing all of 
Australia’s relevant agencies into the same strategic focus. ACORN provides Australian 
citizens with a straightforward method for reporting a wide range of cybercrimes, and it 
enables law enforcement to approach cybercrime holistically. Although it would likely be 
difficult to connect the numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies that have cybercrime 
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investigative authorities with a common strategy, the United States should further examine 
how Australia combats cybercrime and how America can benefit from its strategic 
approaches.  
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Policy makers and strategic planners should consider cybercrime as an independent 
category of criminal activity under the broader issue of cybersecurity. A new strategy for 
combatting cybercrime should emphasize methods for reporting cybercrime and 
establishing a baseline reporting system. The United States should examine international 
law enforcement partnerships and seek opportunities to collaborate on fighting cybercrime. 
Finally, any new strategic initiatives should emphasize partnering with private industry and 




VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It occurs to me that our survival may depend upon our talking to one 
another. 
—Dan Simmons from Hyperion239 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis asked the questions of how TCOs and cybercriminals might leverage 
developing AI technology to conduct more sophisticated criminal activities and what steps 
the homeland security enterprise should take today to prepare. The future of AI-enabled 
cybercrime was envisioned through the examination of four possible scenarios that 
leveraged existing criminal patterns to show how criminal activities may evolve. Because 
cybercrime will become more complicated when criminals incorporate AI into their 
schemes, homeland security officials, policymakers, private-sector leaders, and academic 
institutions will need to work together to confront malicious AI. This chapter presents 
findings from the four future scenarios, conclusions from the tactical and strategic 
responses to AI in cybercrime, and recommendations for the homeland security enterprise 
to defeat the threat of future, malicious AI-enabled cybercrime. The end of this chapter 
suggests areas of future study that were outside the scope of this thesis but deserve 
additional research and examination. 
B. FINDINGS 
This thesis finds that the threat posed by malicious AI is most likely to augment 
existing homeland security and cybercrime threats as opposed to radically change the 
cybercrime landscape. TCOs and cybercriminals have repeatedly demonstrated the 
propensity to adopt emerging technologies and, therefore, are likely to incorporate AI 
software into their criminal operations.240 Cybercrimes—such as spear phishing, identity 
239 Dan Simmons, Hyperion (London: Gollancz, 2011). 
240 Goodman, Future Crimes, loc. 2. 
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theft, and social engineering—will continue to challenge the homeland security enterprise 
and society. Emerging AI technologies will likely offer new access points to target 
potential victims and will add a new level of sophistication to cybercrime. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is unclear when AI technology will develop to the point that 
cybercriminals can incorporate new technological tools into their operations, this thesis 
concludes that the homeland security enterprise needs to immediately start confronting the 
potential threats posed by malicious AI. Previous research into chess-playing software has 
demonstrated that advances in cognitive computing can happen rapidly and catch industry 
experts by surprise.241 AI systems, which can process and analyze large amounts of medical 
test results and associated data, are being incorporated into systems that integrate copious 
amounts of PII via the migration to electronic health records.242 According to a report 
published by Allied Market Research in February 2019, global investments in AI research 
in the medical industry are expected to grow at a combined annual rate of nearly 50 percent 
from 2018 to 2025, signifying the future integration of AI software systems into one of the 
largest industries in the United States.243 Many industries are examining how ML software 
algorithms can help solve big-data challenges, and AI technology will increasingly be 
integrated into expanding aspects of modern digital life.244 Malicious AI may be years or 
even decades away from being used in cybercrime, but it is prudent for the homeland 
security enterprise to begin developing strategies today to manage the potential threat, 
given that AI systems are likely to become a major aspect of our society.  
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TCOs and cybercriminals have demonstrated that they will use technology in new 
and innovative ways, and AI software will likely be integrated into a wide range of 
cybercriminal activities.245 ML systems could be used to analyze large amounts of social 
media postings and assist cybercriminals in social-engineering efforts. Erynn Tomlinson, 
a former cryptocurrency executive, had approximately $30,000 stolen from her bank 
account after hackers used social-engineering methods to gain access.246 In this instance, 
hackers reportedly gained access to Tomlinson’s PII using methods similar to those of 
Kevin Mitnick in the 1980s: the hackers repeatedly exchanged text messages with customer 
service representatives to gain enough PII to access Tomlinson’s account.247 As AI systems 
develop, cybercriminals will almost certainly incorporate new technology into their 
criminal activities and use new software tools in long-established criminal tactics. 
Law enforcement strategies, such as ILP and CompStat, can form the basis of 
policing future AI-enabled cybercrime; however, these methods need to be adapted to 
include indicators of malicious AI use. Education on emerging AI technologies should 
inform law enforcement’s approach to cybercrime. Investigative agencies will need to 
identify indicators and patterns of AI use among cybercriminals to incorporate useful data 
into policing models. ILP develops information and data analysis into crime intelligence 
processes, and law enforcement will need to seek methods for incorporating indicators of 
malicious AI into ILP processes.248 Although emerging technologies will challenge law 
enforcement in new ways, existing enforcement strategies are appropriate tools for 
confronting these challenges. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis offers three recommendations for the homeland security enterprise to 
combat the threat of future AI-enabled crime today. These recommendations form a broad 
policy and strategic framework for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to 
align their activities. Policy makers and legislators, across all levels of government, can 
also follow these recommendations to synchronize efforts to combat future cybercrime. 
1. Develop Strategies to Combat Malicious AI that Align with the New 
National Strategy for AI and the National Cybercrime Strategy
On February 11, 2019, the White House issued an executive order that outlined 
broad, strategic objectives for the United States on the development of artificial 
intelligence.249 The executive order calls for an American AI initiative, governed by five 
principles, to ensure that the United States leads AI innovation, develops a workforce that 
applies AI technologies in future jobs, and creates an environment of public trust in AI 
technologies.250 The American AI initiative instructs federal agencies to dedicate resources 
to high-priority items that could benefit from future AI technologies.251 The recently 
released executive order is a useful framework for executive agencies; however, it lacks 
recommendations regarding the potential threat posed by the malicious use of AI systems. 
This thesis recommends that executive branch agencies with cybersecurity authority 
develop implementation plans to address potential risks from AI-enabled cybercrime. 
As discussed in Chapter V, the National Cyber Strategy for the United States, 
issued in September 2018, was the first national strategy in the United States to specifically 
mention threats posed by cybercriminals.252 Although cybercrime is addressed, this 
strategy offers minimal guidance for federal agencies with cybercrime enforcement 
249 Donald Trump, “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” 
February 11, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-
american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/. 
250 Trump. 
251 Michael Kratsios, “Why the US Needs a Strategy for AI,” Wired, February 11, 2019, https://www. 
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252 Trump, National Cyber Strategy. 
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responsibilities. This thesis recommends that federal agencies develop implementation 
plans that lay out specific goals and actions to combat cybercrime. Federal agencies should 
examine how Australia tracks cybercrime, developing methodologies for measuring 
cybercrime to analyze changes in crime trends and the effectiveness of anti-crime 
operations. These implementation plans should also factor in emerging technologies, such 
as AI, and outline how agencies will track changes in cybercrime threats with the 
development of new technologies. 
2. Expand Engagements with Private Industry and Academic 
Institutions 
Many federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence community members have 
robust initiatives to collaborate with private-sector partners on a wide range of threats to 
national security. Some programs, such as the Domestic Security Alliance Council, co-
chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI, offer forums for 
exchanging information and sharing expertise.253 Other programs, such as the DHS 
Analytic Exchange Program (AEP), fund unclassified, collaborative research by private-
sector and government-security experts on emerging threat topics.254 The Department of 
Defense in the 2015 Cybersecurity Strategy outlines the importance of continuing 
collaboration with private industries and calls for robust dialogue with non-governmental 
partners on cyber defense issues.255  
In 2018, one of the research topics for the DHS Analytic Exchange Program 
focused on developing standards for AI to help mitigate potential risks posed by dual-use 
AI technologies.256 The group—composed of government security experts from the 
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intelligence and law enforcement communities as well as private industry and the RAND 
Corporation—produced an unclassified white paper on its research and presented its 
findings to senior leaders at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.257 AEP 
research topics are selected annually, and the group is funded only to conduct collaborative 
research for approximately six months. This thesis recommends that programs, such as the 
DHS Analytic Exchange Program, be reviewed by senior leaders at federal agencies and 
more funding and time be dedicated to collaborate on emerging threat issues. Research on 
AI technology should be a prime topic for additional collaboration, and federal agencies 
should use the AEP as a potential model for private-sector engagement. 
Because the development of AI safety tools will continue to be an important topic 
in coming years, the homeland security enterprise should engage with private industry and 
academic centers to participate in dialogues about the creation of these tools. Forums 
hosted by organizations such as the Future of Life Institute offer opportunities for public 
security officials to understand how AI technologies are developing and to be a part of the 
development of new AI safety initiatives. Although the Future of Life Institute’s 2018 
conference in Puerto Rico on beneficial artificial general intelligence hosted participants 
from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, no law enforcement agency 
participated.258 This thesis recommends that homeland security officials seek out 
organizations such as the Future of Life Institute and engage in their collaborative seminars 
to ensure that homeland security perspectives are included in discussions on the implication 
of emerging AI developments. 
3. Expand Partnerships with International Law Enforcement 
Organizations to Combat AI-Enabled Cybercrime 
In all four of the future scenarios, the criminals leverage international travel as a 
means to avoid detection from U.S. law enforcement officials and to potentially complicate 
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investigations into their criminal activities. Future cybercrimes will become borderless, so 
law enforcement agencies must adopt an appropriate international response.259 
Partnerships with international law enforcement organizations like INTERPOL and 
EUROPOL will continue to provide value to U.S.-based cybercrime investigations, and the 
homeland security enterprise should examine ways to collaborate with international law 
enforcement partners on the threat of future AI-enabled cybercrime.  
A robust network of law enforcement associations that support cybercrime 
investigations exists in the United States, and many of these groups have connections with 
foreign law enforcement agencies. The High Technology Crime Investigation Association, 
the International Association of Computer Investigative Specialists, and many fusion 
centers within the National Network of Fusion Centers, to name a few, collaborate with 
foreign law enforcement agencies and associations to combat emerging cybercrime threats. 
Homeland security officials should leverage these partnerships to expand their focus to the 
potential of emerging malicious AI and begin discussions into policing strategies and 
tactics that confront borderless crime in the future.  
E. NEXT STEPS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis was scoped to examine how TCOs and cybercriminals—motivated by 
profit—could potentially leverage emerging AI technologies in their operations. As a 
result, this thesis did not examine how nation-states or non-state organizations could use 
AI against U.S. interests, nor did it explore the ethical considerations of developing or 
using AI. The threat of malicious AI use will likely transcend threat actor categories—the 
United States might see foreign terrorist organizations adopt emerging technologies in their 
operations. While this thesis has focused on profit motivation as the primary driver for the 
malicious use of AI, the homeland security enterprise could be confronted by non–criminal 
focused AI threats. 
The framework and methodology of this thesis could be adapted to examine how 
hostile nation-states or non-state organizations could use emerging AI technologies against 
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the United States. There has been a recent uptick in media coverage of Chinese investments 
in AI technologies, and security experts have begun to publicly question how China’s focus 
on developing AI will affect U.S. national and economic security interests.260 On January 
22, 2019, Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats published a four-year strategic plan 
for the intelligence community that specifically highlights future threats from China’s AI 
development.261 U.S. counterintelligence officials have also expressed concerns about 
Chinese students using student visa programs to study in U.S. universities, steal intellectual 
property, and recruit spies.262 Issues related to nation states’ and non-state groups’ use of 
emerging AI technologies to threaten U.S. interests are worthy of additional study and have 
direct links to homeland security research. 
Other potential avenues for future AI research include the ethical implications of 
AI development as well as appropriate methods for law enforcement and intelligence 
officials to monitor and review AI software systems. A growing body of research by 
computer scientists, ethicists, and privacy advocates examines the ethical implications of 
AI. Homeland security officials should participate in these debates and add their 
perspectives from across the diverse range of expertise. Paramount to examining the ethics 
of AI development is a thorough and thoughtful review of the privacy implications of 
homeland security officials monitoring online AI systems. PII and other personal 
information are likely to be integrated into future AI-enabled technologies and hardware. 
Now is the time to review the implications and legality of how law enforcement officials 
will examine personal information that underlies AI software. 
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F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Future AI systems will dramatically change society and become integrated into 
major facets of our day-to-day lives. This thesis began the examination of how emerging 
AI technologies could be used for malicious purposes by TCOs and cybercriminals to 
threaten society in new ways. The threat of criminal actors creating malevolent AI 
introduces new challenges to present-day cybercrimes; homeland security officials, 
policymakers, private-sector leaders, and academic institutions will need to collaborate in 
confronting these threats. Ultimately, the threat to the United States posed by potential AI-
enabled cybercrime can be mitigated by understanding how AI systems function and are 
being developed and by ensuring that the homeland security enterprise becomes an active 
participant in public policy forums on the future of AI technology. 
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